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US 政権に直結した戦略シンクタンク : 「中共政権崩壊」は不可避、かつ差し迫っている → US 政府のとるべき緊急戦略を提言

· 約274分

前置き​

US 政府の保守系シンクタンク的存在である Hudson Inst. が先ごろ公表した講演動画を取り上げる。この動画の重大な意味に気づいているのは政治・経済の専門家でもごく少数の筈。それは、

"After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China" （崩壊後の中国：ポスト共産党時代の計画）

という講演動画。複数の中国専門家による多岐にわたる内容なので、動画は 3時間を超える。これを AI で整理した。

US 上層部は近い将来の中国崩壊を前提にして戦略的に動いていることがわかる。US は崩壊後の中国の民主化や憲法のあり方まで検討しているというから、恐れ入る。US は倒れた中国をその骨の髄まで食い尽くす気で、虎視眈々と準備を進めている。

日本政府は準備どころか、ある日突然、倒れた中国の余波をくらって茫然自失、中国在住の 10万の日本人救出に右往左往するも…となる筈。

概要​

AI

ポスト共産主義中国の計画: 崩壊後の戦略的展望

この文書は、‌‌ハドソン研究所‌‌が主催した「ポスト共産主義中国の計画」に関する会議の転写の一部です。この会議は、中国共産党の潜在的な崩壊と、それが国際社会に与える影響に焦点を当てています。

‌‌ジョン・ウォルターズ‌‌氏と‌‌マイルズ・ユー‌‌氏が会議の目的を述べ、CCP崩壊後の課題、例えば安定化、核兵器や生物兵器の確保、真実と和解の推進、憲法による統治への移行などについて議論しています。

‌‌ランディ・シュライバー‌‌氏は、特に混乱期における中国の安全保障部隊の役割と、将来的にそれらが結束を保つ可能性について語っています。

最後に、‌‌ゴードン・チャン‌‌氏と‌‌リック・フィッシャー‌‌氏は、中国崩壊時の経済的措置、例えば資産凍結や米国企業の撤退、そして中国の軍事能力の再構築の必要性など、具体的な行動について提案しています。

目次​

  1. 前置き
  2. 概要
  3. 音声対話
  4. 詳細
    1. 1. 会議の目的と CCP 崩壊の前提
    2. 2. CCP 崩壊後の即時課題と安全保障
    3. 3. 経済・金融面の課題と対応
    4. 4. 長期的課題：憲法、正義、社会変革
    5. 5. 会議全体を通しての主要テーマ
  5. 時系列：ポスト共産主義中国の計画
  6. 主要関係者
  7. 歴史上の人物、言及された人物
  8. 分裂しない可能性が高い（習近平時代の中央統制強化）
  9. 民族的復讐の防止（チベット・新疆
  10. 真相究明と和解プロセス
    1. 真相究明と和解プロセスの必要性
    2. 課題と潜在的なリスク
    3. 真相究明と和解プロセスへのアプローチとリソース
    4. 即座の具体的な措置
  11. 緊急措置（ビジネス・金融）
    1. 緊急措置（ビジネス・金融）の必要性
    2. 具体的な提言
    3. 避けるべきこと
  12. 米国在住中国人（学生、国民）と日米関係
  13. 失敗へのヘッジ戦略
  14. ロシアとの関係がより複雑である可能性
  15. ファイル（Dossier）制度
  16. 具体的な地域
    1. 1. 自治地域（特別行政区および民族自治区）
    2. 2. その他の地域と国境問題
    3. 3. 移行期の政策と課題
  17. 中国共産党の崩壊は現実的か？（党自身が毎日懸念）
  18. 先例：ソ連共産主義の突然の崩壊
  19. 大規模な難民流出の可能性
  20. 情報源
    1. 動画概要欄
  21. 文字起こし

音声対話​

途中で音声が途切れている期間がある。

AI

https://notebooklm.google.com/notebook/2be0f6ce-5553-4ec7-814e-6467d2ab5f39/audio

詳細​

AI

ハドソン研究所主催「ポスト共産主義中国の計画」会議ブリーフィング資料

このブリーフィング資料は、ハドソン研究所が開催した「ポスト共産主義中国の計画（Planning for a Post-Communist China）」会議の講演動画の文字起こしを基に作成された。本会議は、中国共産党（CCP）の潜在的な崩壊と、それに伴う国際社会が直面する課題への戦略的先見性を行使することを目的としている。

1. 会議の目的と CCP 崩壊の前提​

ハドソン研究所のジョン・ウォルターズ所長兼 CEO は、CCP が「前例のない経済成長と積極的な世界的統合の40年」を経て、「ますます不確実な経済見通し、より敵対的な国際環境、習近平の政治的中央集権化の努力により課題に適応できない脆い統治モデル」といった複雑な構造的変化に直面していると指摘した (0:00:32)。マイルズ・ユー中国センター所長は、CCP の崩壊は「世界がナチス・ドイツ、大日本帝国、そして東欧におけるソビエト共産主義の崩壊後に直面したのと同様の困難な課題」を提示すると強調し、その対応として体制の安定化と社会の正常化が重要であると述べた (0:03:15)。CCP 自体が崩壊を常に意識していることから、このシナリオは非現実的ではないとユー所長は主張する (0:50:59)。

2. CCP 崩壊後の即時課題と安全保障​

CCP 崩壊後の即時の課題として、ユー所長はチベットや新疆における民族間の報復防止、国境の確保、核兵器や生物兵器研究所の安全確保、そして「共産主義による70年、80年近くの統治は嘘と虚偽に満ちている」ため、「真実和解プロセス」の確立を挙げた (0:03:40)。

ランディ・シュライバー氏は、中国の治安部隊、特に人民解放軍（PLA）と人民武装警察（PAP）が果たす役割の重要性を強調した (0:08:32)。彼は、文化大革命や天安門事件における PLA の役割に言及し、PAP が国内の治安維持において強化され、重要インフラの保護や生物兵器・核兵器関連施設の確保を行うと予測した (0:08:56)。シュライバー氏は、習近平政権下での中央集権化の強化により、治安部隊が崩壊後に分裂する可能性は低いと見ている (0:11:38)。彼は、PLA が当面の間、「国内の安定を支援するために内向きに焦点を合わせる」だろうと述べた (0:13:18)。また、外部からの脅威については、「この移行期間における外部からの脅威の概念は非常に限られるだろう」とし、中国は「非常に有能な軍隊」を維持すると付け加えた (0:15:36)。

3. 経済・金融面の課題と対応​

ゴードン・チャン氏は、CCP 崩壊後のビジネスと金融に関する対応について言及した。彼は、「中国が崩壊する、つまり中央政府が機能しなくなった場合、我々の国にある中国の資産を可能な限り迅速に差し押さえ、凍結すべきだ」と主張した (0:20:41)。これは、世界的な金融市場の混乱を防ぎ、アメリカの預金者を保護するためである (0:21:13)。特に、中国の銀行は簿価上は破綻状態にある可能性が高く、中央政府の支援がなくなれば貸付価値が劇的に下落すると指摘した (0:22:50)。チャン氏は、米国政府が他の国との調整なしに迅速に行動し、中国が保有する米国債のような外貨準備も差し押さえるべきだと述べた (0:25:42)。さらに、スミスフィールド・フーズのような中国が所有する米国企業も、米国の利益が損なわれているとして差し押さえるべきだと主張した (0:27:13)。

一方で、チャン氏は、米国が特定の中国の派閥を支持したり、CCP を「知っている悪魔」として安定のために支援したりすべきではないと警告した (0:30:25)。彼は、過去に米国大統領が「中国共産主義を救った」事例（ニクソンと毛沢東、ブッシュと鄧小平、クリントンとWTO加盟）を挙げ、それが「今日に至るまで我々の民主主義を打倒しようとしている体制を救った」と批判した (0:31:31)。

4. 長期的課題：憲法、正義、社会変革​

4.1 過去の体制転換からの教訓​

マイルズ・ユー所長は、東ドイツや北朝鮮の事例に言及し、体制崩壊後の安定化と社会変革において、周辺国（西ドイツや韓国）が重要な役割を果たすことを指摘した。しかし、中国の場合は台湾が規模的に小さいため、「台湾が中国社会の安定化と変革にどのような役割を果たすべきか」という疑問を呈した (0:51:52)。ランディ・シュライバー氏は、台湾はむしろ「独立したアイデンティティ」を追求する可能性が高いと述べ、中国本土の統治に直接関与することはないだろうと推測した (0:53:21)。リック・フィッシャー氏は、独立した台湾の存在が「ポスト共産主義中国にとって最善のこと」であり、「多元的な民主主義をどのように移行させるかという包括的な大学」として本土が同じ移行を行う上で不可欠であると付け加えた (0:54:24)。

4.2. 人民解放軍（PLA）と共産党員への対応​

ゴードン・チャン氏は、CCP 崩壊後、中国人は現在のような大規模な軍隊を望まない可能性があり、「これらの資産の多くが錆びついていく」と予測した (0:56:34)。リック・フィッシャー氏は、CCP の党員（1億人以上）への対応について、まず彼らを「世界に特定」し、「個人ファイルは一定程度公開されるべきだ」と述べた (0:58:17)。彼は、毛沢東時代に犠牲になった人々への正義を求めることの重要性を強調した (0:59:36)。ランディ・シュライバー氏は、脱ナチ化や脱バアス化の経験を引用し、過去の経験から組織の機能を維持するためには、あまりにも深くシステムから人々を排除するべきではないと警鐘を鳴らした (1:05:45)。

4.3. 経済的再構築と国際協力​

ゴードン・チャン氏は、CCP の「一帯一路」構想（BRI）が中国国民に不評であることを指摘し、崩壊後はこれらの経済的に実行不可能なプロジェクトへの支援がなくなるだろうと予測した (0:56:12)。彼は、中国の金融システムの「内部崩壊か爆発」を予測し、人民元が「今日よりもさらに使われなくなる」と述べた (1:03:05)。

4.4. 統治システムと伝統​

ピエロ・タジ氏は、中国の統治システムを「全体主義的システム」と定義し、そのルーツは「法家」思想にあると分析した (1:25:43)。彼は、現在の「社会信用システム」や「戸籍制度（hukou）」が、国民を統制し「予防的抑圧」を行うための手段として機能していると指摘した (1:32:15)。タジ氏は、CCP 崩壊後には、法家思想が拒否された漢王朝の例に倣い、「儒教的立憲主義」の出現や、広東省のような地域における「よりリベラルな政権の出現」といった「地方化」が進む可能性があると予測した (1:42:33)。彼は、台湾の中華民国憲法に存在する「五権分立」（考選院と監察院）が、中国固有の立憲主義に遡る例として挙げられた (1:43:07)。

4.5. 移行期正義と人権​

ウィリアム・ニー氏は、CCP 崩壊後の移行期正義の課題について、その「非常に長い歴史」と「組織的な反対勢力の欠如」を指摘した (1:46:37)。彼は、大躍進、文化大革命、天安門事件、新疆ウイグル自治区におけるジェノサイドなど、CCP による数々の人権侵害を列挙し、「どこから始めるべきか」という問題提起を行った (1:48:00)。ニー氏は、チリの事例のように高レベルの委員会を設置することや、中国の広大な地理的・政治的違いを考慮した「地域委員会」の必要性を提案した (1:53:42)。彼はまた、ウイグル人権法廷や新疆被害者データベースなど、人権侵害の記録化における市民社会の努力を強調し、国連システムや宗教コミュニティとの対話の可能性を提示した (1:54:28)。

ニー氏は、習近平の「中華民族の偉大な復興」というスローガンが「恐怖、治安国家の強制措置、権力投射」によってのみ達成されるのではなく、「道徳と美徳に基づいた偉大さ」を追求する可能性もあると述べた (1:58:27)。

ニナ・ツィエ氏は、CCP 崩壊後の米国の政策が、「独立、民主主義、言論の自由、信教の自由、その他基本的な人権を推進する」ことに焦点を当てるべきだと主張した (2:00:34)。彼女は、ソ連崩壊時のジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ政権の「五つの指導原則」（自決、既存国境の承認、民主主義と法の支配の支持、人権と少数民族の権利の保護、国際法と義務の尊重）を中国に適用することを提案した (2:03:16)。ツィエ氏は、香港、新疆、チベット、内モンゴル、寧夏回族自治区といった「自治地域」や「特別行政区」が独立を選択する可能性が高いと予測し、米国は彼らの独立を支援する準備をすべきだと述べた (2:01:38)。具体的な即時行動として、政治犯や宗教犯の解放、強制不妊手術や強制堕胎の中止、強制収容所の閉鎖、臓器移植の一時停止、礼拝所の再開、CCP の思想教育の中止などを挙げた (2:14:37)。

4.6. 新憲法の策定​

ドン・クラーク氏は、CCP 崩壊後の中国における新憲法制定のプロセスについて論じた。彼は、ソ連や清王朝の崩壊の経験を引き合いに出し、中央政府の権威が失われても「完全な無政府状態」にはならず、何らかの「権威の源」が出現すると予測した (2:18:20)。クラーク氏は、外部の人間が憲法制定プロセスに「実際的で有用な助言」を提供することは難しいとし、その内容が「極めて地方的な政治的考慮」によって決定されると指摘した (2:19:47)。彼は、憲法が「政治的妥協」を含む必要があり、そうでない憲法は「誰も無視する」可能性が高いと述べた (2:20:57)。

クラーク氏は、憲法の正当性を「上流の正当性」（憲法制定会議の構成）、「プロセスの正当性」（草案作成プロセスの透明性と公開性）、そして「下流の正当性」（批准プロセス）の3つの側面から分析した (2:28:40)。彼は、中国のような巨大で多様な国において、全ての地域で統一的なアプローチを取ることは困難であり、国民投票による批准が「真の政治的正当性」の源になると結論付けた (2:57:01)。ピエロ・タジ氏は、中国の伝統にも「普遍的価値」の概念が存在するとし、中華民国憲法に見られる「五権分立」が西洋の影響だけでなく、中国固有の立憲主義からも影響を受けていることを指摘した (2:58:46)。

5. 会議全体を通しての主要テーマ​

  • CCP 崩壊の可能性と準備の緊急性: 専門家たちは、CCP 崩壊のシナリオを現実的な可能性として捉え、国際社会がそれに備えることの重要性を強調した。
  • 安全保障と秩序の維持: 崩壊後の混乱を防ぎ、核兵器や生物兵器などの危険な資産を確保し、治安部隊の役割を理解することの重要性が指摘された。
  • 経済・金融の安定化: 中国経済の規模を考えると、崩壊は世界経済に甚大な影響を与えるため、中国資産の凍結や差し押さえといった迅速な措置の必要性が議論された。
  • 移行期正義と人権: 過去の人権侵害への対処、真実和解プロセスの確立、そして少数民族や市民社会の権利保護が、民主的な社会への移行に不可欠であるとされた。
  • 憲法制定と統治モデル: 中国固有の伝統（儒教、法家）と、西洋の民主主義の原則（権力分立、普遍的価値）を融合させた新しい統治モデルの構築が議論された。
  • 地域主義と自己決定: 中国の多様性を考慮し、各地域が独自の道を模索する可能性（独立、自治、他国との合併）が提示され、それに対する国際社会の支援のあり方が検討された。
  • 情報と世論の役割: インターネットとソーシャルメディアが、情報統制の崩壊と世論形成に果たす役割の重要性が強調された。

この会議は、CCP 崩壊という困難だが起こりうるシナリオに備え、米国とその同盟国がどのように中国の未来を形作るかについての深い洞察と具体的な提言を提供した。

時系列：ポスト共産主義中国の計画​

AI

‌‌紀元前11世紀～8世紀 (西周王朝)Hukou制度の根源‌‌: 戸籍登録制度の概念が初期の王朝時代に遡る。

‌‌紀元前221年～206年 (秦王朝) 法家主義の台頭‌‌: 人口管理、大規模な強制労働、徴兵制のための戸籍制度が秦王朝で顕著になる。法家主義は準全体主義的な理論として紹介され、地方監視、集団責任、懲罰に重点を置く。

‌‌紀元前206年～紀元220年 (漢王朝) 法家主義の拒絶と儒教の台頭‌‌: 漢王朝は秦王朝の法家主義を拒絶し、儒教の思想を取り入れることで、法律や集団懲罰などの側面を緩和する。

‌‌1900年 義和団の乱‌‌: 清王朝が世界に宣戦布告し、南部省が自治と独立を宣言する。

‌‌1911年 清王朝の崩壊‌‌: 中央政府の権威が完全に崩壊し、地方の省が独自のアイデンティティと政治的行動能力を維持する。

‌‌1912年 中華民国憲法の制定‌‌: 孫文の中華民国憲法は、西洋の思想と中国の伝統的な憲法思想の両方を取り入れた5権分立の制度（考試院と監察院を含む）を特徴とする。

‌‌1917年 対敵通商法‌‌: 米国で制定された法律で、大統領が非常事態時に金融資産の凍結などの権限を行使できる。

‌‌1919年 五四運動‌‌: 中国における憲法制定と民主主義の理念の出発点として言及される。

‌‌1949年 共産党の支配‌‌: 中国共産党が中国を支配し、中華人民共和国が成立する。

‌‌1950年代初頭 反革命分子の鎮圧‌‌: 50万人から200万人が死亡する。

‌‌1958年 毛沢東時代のHukou制度の本格化‌‌: 人々を特定の場所（特に農村部）に縛り付け、国内移動を管理するための戸籍制度が本格的に導入される。

‌‌1966年～1976年 (文化大革命) PLAの役割‌‌: 人民解放軍（PLA）が国内の混乱を鎮圧し、核兵器施設を保護し、地方レベルで革命的な統治評議会を形成する上で重要な役割を果たす。 死者の数: 文化大革命で殺された人々の真の数が議論される。

‌‌1972年 ニクソン大統領の北京訪問‌‌: リチャード・ニクソン米大統領が文化大革命の最中に毛沢東を救済し、米中関係を正常化する。

‌‌1977年 国際緊急経済権限法 (IEEPA)‌‌: 米国で制定された法律で、大統領が国家緊急事態時に経済権限を行使できる。

‌‌1980年代初頭 ソ連の脅威‌‌: ソ連共産党の終焉を想像する者はほとんどいない。

‌‌1982年 人民武装警察の創設‌‌: 人民武装警察（PAP）が創設される。

‌‌1989年 天安門事件‌‌: PLAが国内の騒乱鎮圧に使用される。天安門事件後、人民武装警察への投資が大幅に増加する。

  • 東欧とソ連圏の共産主義政権の崩壊: 米国による新たな共和国の迅速な承認と外交関係の樹立が行われる。チェコスロバキアでは、共産党政府が辞任し、ヴァーツラフ・ハヴェルが暫定大統領に任命される。
  • ジョージ・H.W.ブッシュ大統領による鄧小平の救済: 天安門事件後に鄧小平を救済する。

‌‌1989年11月 ドイツ再統一‌‌: ヘルムート・コール西ドイツ首相が東ドイツでの自由選挙と再統一のプログラムを発表する。

‌‌1990年半ば 東欧の民主化‌‌: 東欧の旧共産主義政権はすべて民主的に選出された政府に置き換わる。

‌‌1990年6月 チェコスロバキアの自由選挙‌‌: チェコの市民が自由選挙でハヴェルを大統領に選出する。

‌‌1993年 (カンボジア) 移行期の正義‌‌: 西洋型の人権・法制度が導入され、多額の資金が投入される。

‌‌1996年 台湾海峡危機‌‌: 米国が2隻の空母を派遣し、PLAが台湾を奪取し、米国の介入に対処するための地域紛争に備える。

‌‌1999年 中国の経済低迷期‌‌: ビル・クリントン米大統領が世界貿易機関（WTO）協定に署名し、中国のWTO加盟への道を開く。

‌‌2001年12月 中国のWTO加盟‌‌: 中国が世界貿易機関に加盟する。

‌‌2009年7月5日 ウルムチ虐殺‌‌: 新疆ウイグル自治区ウルムチ市で発生した暴動と鎮圧。

‌‌2011年 烏坎村の暴動‌‌: 人民武装警察が国内の騒乱鎮圧に動員される。

‌‌2012年 共産党第9号文書‌‌: 中国共産党が「普遍的価値」を西洋の押し付けであるとして拒絶する文書を発行する。

‌‌2013年 中国の宇宙計画‌‌:

  • 中国の主要な航空宇宙企業が100年間の太陽系占領計画を発表する。
  • 「今後50年で中国が戦うべき6つの戦争」: 中国のインターネット上で広く流布する。

‌‌2015年7月9日 709弁護士弾圧‌‌: 中国で人権派弁護士や活動家が大規模に拘束される。

‌‌2018年 人民武装警察の改革‌‌: 人民武装警察が中央軍事委員会に従属することが明確になる。

‌‌2018年12月 2人のカナダ人の拘束‌‌: 米国の要請による孟晩舟ファーウェイCFOのカナダでの拘束への報復として、中国が2人のカナダ人を拘束する。

‌‌2019年 公共安全大臣の発言‌‌: 趙克志公共安全大臣が「政治的リスクの防止が最優先事項」と述べる。

‌‌2019年10月 ポンペオ国務長官の発言‌‌: マイク・ポンペオ米国務長官が中国国民と中国共産党は異なる概念であると発言し、中国側を激怒させる。

‌‌2020年‌‌:

  • 香港国家安全維持法: 香港で施行され、民主化運動への弾圧を強化する。
  • チベット政策・支援法: トランプ大統領が署名し、チベット人の宗教的指導者の選択権などを支持する。
  • ポンペオ国務長官の演説: マイク・ポンペオ米国務長官がニクソンセンターで、中国政府が中国国民と直接対話することに最も動揺したと発言する。
  • コロナ禍における食肉販売: Smithfield Foodsが米国の豚肉を中国に販売し、米国の利益を損なうと指摘される。

‌‌現在‌‌:

  • 習近平の政治的中央集権化: 習近平の政治的中央集権化の取り組みにより、中国共産党の統治モデルが脆弱化している。
  • 中国経済の不確実性: 中国は複雑な構造変化に直面している。
  • 敵対的な国際環境: 中国は国際的に敵対的な環境に直面している。
  • ウイグル人・チベット人の処理: ウイグル人やチベット人の大規模な「処理」が行われていると指摘される。
  • CCPのパラノイア: 中国共産党は政権崩壊のパラノイアに日々生きており、あらゆる国際的な関与は体制の脆弱性に関するものである。
  • 台湾の民主主義モデル: 台湾は、中華圏の社会が民主主義に移行できることを示す強力なメッセージとなっている。
  • 中国の対外援助プロジェクト: 一帯一路などの大規模なプロジェクトは、中国国民の貧困と対照的であるため、国民から不評である。
  • 中国共産党の党員: 1億人を超える党員の存在は、政権崩壊後の「非ナチ化」や「脱バース党化」のような処理が必要になる可能性がある。
  • 人民元: 人民元は国際的に自由に交換できず、危機時には信頼性がさらに低下する。
  • Hukou制度の不平等: 戸籍制度は依然として不平等を助長している。
  • テクノロジーによる監視: 顔認証システムや社会信用システムなどの技術が、国民を統制するために広く利用されている。
  • タオイズムの「無為」: 抑圧的な国家に対する受動的抵抗の形態として言及される。
  • 国民の支持率の議論: 中国政府に対する国民の支持率に関する調査結果は、情報統制と表現の自由の欠如により信頼できないと指摘される。
  • 中国共産党の性質: 中国共産党はマルクス・レーニン主義の政権であり、ファシスト的手法とアプローチを用いていると定義される。

主要関係者​

AI

  • ジョン・ウォルターズ: ハドソン研究所の所長兼CEO。会議の開会の挨拶を担当。

  • マイルズ・ユー博士: ハドソン研究所中国センターの上級研究員兼所長。会議の司会と講演者を務める。中国共産党の崩壊後の中国に対する戦略的洞察の必要性を強調。

  • ランディ・シュライバー: 会議の講演者の一人。主に中国の治安部隊、特にPLAとPAPの役割に焦点を当てる。

  • ゴードン・チャン: 元ポール・ライヒと上海パートナーの総領事、ベーカー＆マッケンジー香港。中国の金融問題、特に政権崩壊後の資産凍結と中国企業の対応について講演。

  • リック・フィッシャー: 国際評価戦略センターのアジア軍事問題担当上級研究員。中国の軍事力とその将来への影響について講演。また、中国共産党の党員処理の問題にも言及。

  • ピエロ・タジ: 米国議会・行政府中国問題委員会のスタッフディレクター。中国の監視国家、戸籍制度、社会信用システム、およびその他の抑圧的ツールについて講演。

  • ウィリアム・ニー: 全米民主主義基金（NED）アジア地域プログラムのシニアマネージャー。移行期の正義、特に中国の歴史的虐待への対処と、将来の中国社会における市民社会の役割に焦点を当てる。

  • ニーナ・シエ: ハドソン研究所の上級研究員（マイルズ・ユーの同僚）。中国の民族自治地域の将来の政治的地位、特に香港、新疆、チベット、内モンゴル、寧夏の独立の可能性について講演。

  • ドン・クラーク教授: ジョージ・ワシントン大学法学部の名誉教授。中国における憲法制定のプロセスと、外部からの介入の限界について講演。

歴史上の人物、言及された人物​

AI

  • 習近平: 中国共産党中央委員会総書記。政治的な中央集権化と「中国の夢」を推進。

  • 毛沢東: 中華人民共和国の初代国家主席。文化大革命の指導者。

  • 鄧小平: 中国の最高指導者。天安門事件後、ジョージ・H.W.ブッシュ大統領に救済された。

  • リチャード・ニクソン: 第37代アメリカ合衆国大統領。文化大革命の最中に毛沢東を救済した。

  • ジョージ・H.W.ブッシュ: 第41代アメリカ合衆国大統領。天安門事件後に鄧小平を救済し、ソ連崩壊時に新たな共和国の承認を主導した。

  • ビル・クリントン: 第42代アメリカ合衆国大統領。中国のWTO加盟を推進した。

  • ラム・エマニュエル: アメリカの政治家。危機を無駄にしてはいけないという格言で引用された。

  • ロバート・ゲイツ: 元米国防長官。冷戦終結を「喜びのない勝利」と表現した。

  • ジュ・ウェンジー: 中国の政治家。

  • マイク・ポンペオ: 元米国務長官。中国国民と共産党を区別する発言で中国政府を激怒させた。

  • メン・ワンジョウ: ファーウェイCFO。米国の要請によりカナダで拘束された。

  • カール・シュミット: ドイツの法学者。

  • レオ・シュトラウス: ドイツ生まれのアメリカの政治哲学者。

  • ヤオ・チェン: 中国の政治家。

  • 李登輝: 元中華民国総統。台湾の民主化の父。中国を7つの地域に分けるという考えを持っていた。

  • 孔子: 中国の思想家。儒教の創始者。

  • 韓非子: 中国の思想家。法家思想の代表的な人物。

  • 商鞅: 中国の政治家。秦の孝公に仕え、法家思想に基づく改革を行った。

  • 王滬寧: 中国共産党の重要な理論家。江沢民、胡錦濤、習近平に仕えた。

  • スティーブン・コトキン: 歴史家。ソ連の歴史、特にスターリンの研究で知られる。

  • ペ・ミンシン: 中国政治専門家。

  • 趙克志: 中華人民共和国公安部長。

  • ホナス・クン: 儒教の物語に登場する人物。

  • チャン・キョン: 儒教憲法主義の提唱者。

  • タキトゥス: ローマ帝国の歴史家。

  • ライ・チン・デ: 中華民国総統。

  • バツラフ・ハベル: チェコ共和国の初代大統領。

  • ヘルムート・コール: ドイツの政治家。ドイツ再統一を主導した。

  • ジミー・ライ: 香港の民主活動家。

  • ダライ・ラマ14世: チベット仏教の最高指導者。

  • イルハム・トフティ: ウイグル人の学者。

  • 王毅: 中国のキリスト教牧師。

  • マイケル・ペティス: 経済学者。

  • サミュエル・ジョンソン: イギリスの作家。ナショナリズムはならず者の最後の避難所であるという言葉を引用された。

  • ニール・ゴーサッチ: アメリカ合衆国最高裁判所判事。

  • フランク・グッドナウ: アメリカの政治学者。

  • ジョセフ・スティルウェル: アメリカの陸軍大将。

  • レイハン・アサット: ウイグル人の人権活動家。

  • アクバル・アサット: レイハン・アサットの兄。拘束されている。

  • イアン・ジョンソン: ジャーナリスト、作家。

  • 趙紫陽: 元中国共産党中央委員会総書記。

  • アレクサンダー・ハミルトン: アメリカ合衆国の建国の父の一人。

  • マーク・タシュネット: 法学者。憲法制定の専門家。

分裂しない可能性が高い（習近平時代の中央統制強化）​

AI

崩壊後の中国における軍事組織の役割というより大きな文脈において、情報源は人民解放軍（PLA）と人民武装警察（PAP）が‌‌分裂する可能性が低い‌‌と議論しており、これは特に習近平時代の中央統制強化の取り組みに起因しています。

具体的には、以下の点が強調されています。

  • ‌‌習近平による中央統制の強化‌‌: 習近平時代には、中央集権的統制を強化するための取り組みが行われました。これは、個人の忠誠だけでなく、党と中央統治機構への忠誠を確保することを目的とした粛清を伴いました。
  • ‌‌天安門事件からの教訓‌‌: 天安門事件（1989年）での経験が、軍の分裂を防ぐための改革に影響を与えました。当時、北京地域に展開されたPLA部隊は、同胞であるデモ参加者に発砲したがらなかったため、分裂や地方レベルでの忠誠の分散を防ぐための多くの改革が実施されました。
  • ‌‌軍事組織の結束の可能性‌‌: これらの努力により、人民解放軍と人民武装警察は‌‌結束を保つ可能性が高い‌‌と考えられています。彼らが地方や省レベルの指導者の間で忠誠を分裂させる可能性は低いと予測されています。
  • ‌‌党への忠誠の移行‌‌: 軍事組織は党に忠誠を誓う「党の軍隊」であり、憲法や国家ではなく党に忠誠を誓っています。しかし、情報源は、もし中国共産党が崩壊した場合でも、これらの部隊が‌‌結束を保ち、その忠誠と並外れた能力を、どのような形であれ次に来る共産主義後の政府へと移行させる‌‌可能性が高いと示唆しています。

この結束は、中国が共産主義体制崩壊後も‌‌非常に有能な軍事力を維持する‌‌ことを意味します。軍は短期的には国内の安定維持に重点を置くと予想されますが、その後は地域大国、さらには世界的大国としての地位を再確立しようとする可能性があります。この点は、米国とその同盟国が中国の将来を計画する上で考慮すべき重要な要素となります。崩壊後の中国における軍事組織の役割というより大きな文脈において、情報源は人民解放軍（PLA）と人民武装警察（PAP）が‌‌分裂する可能性が低い‌‌と議論しており、これは特に習近平時代の中央統制強化の取り組みに起因しています。

具体的には、以下の点が強調されています。

  • ‌‌習近平による中央統制の強化‌‌: 習近平時代には、中央集権的統制を強化するための取り組みが行われました。これは、個人の忠誠だけでなく、党と中央統治機構への忠誠を確保することを目的とした粛清を伴いました。
  • ‌‌天安門事件からの教訓‌‌: 天安門事件（1989年）での経験が、軍の分裂を防ぐための改革に影響を与えました。当時、北京地域に展開されたPLA部隊は、同胞であるデモ参加者に発砲したがらなかったため、分裂や地方レベルでの忠誠の分散を防ぐための多くの改革が実施されました。
  • ‌‌軍事組織の結束の可能性‌‌: これらの努力により、人民解放軍と人民武装警察は‌‌結束を保つ可能性が高い‌‌と考えられています。彼らが地方や省レベルの指導者の間で忠誠を分裂させる可能性は低いと予測されています。
  • ‌‌党への忠誠の移行‌‌: 軍事組織は党に忠誠を誓う「党の軍隊」であり、憲法や国家ではなく党に忠誠を誓っています。しかし、情報源は、もし中国共産党が崩壊した場合でも、これらの部隊が‌‌結束を保ち、その忠誠と並外れた能力を、どのような形であれ次に来る共産主義後の政府へと移行させる‌‌可能性が高いと示唆しています。

この結束は、中国が共産主義体制崩壊後も‌‌非常に有能な軍事力を維持する‌‌ことを意味します。軍は短期的には国内の安定維持に重点を置くと予想されますが、その後は地域大国、さらには世界的大国としての地位を再確立しようとする可能性があります。この点は、米国とその同盟国が中国の将来を計画する上で考慮すべき重要な要素となります。

民族的復讐の防止（チベット・新疆​

AI

崩壊後の中国における緊急の課題というより大きな文脈において、情報源は‌‌チベットと新疆における民族的復讐の防止‌‌が最優先の喫緊の課題であると強調しています。これは、共産主義体制崩壊後の中国における国内の安定と秩序ある移行を確保するために極めて重要です。

民族的復讐への懸念は、チベット人とウイグル人が‌‌「中国で最も抑圧され、したがって最も被害を受けている少数民族」‌‌であるという認識に由来しています。これらの地域は、中国共産党（CCP）の支配下で、過去および現在にわたって‌‌深刻な人権侵害と残虐行為‌‌を受けてきました。これには、ウイグル地域でのジェノサイドも含まれます。具体的には以下の点が挙げられます。

  • ウイグル人が受けた「人道に対する罪」と「ジェノサイド」は、北京への信頼を完全に失わせました。
  • 新疆における漢民族の大量移入と、その中の一部が抑圧のために送られたことに対する深い恨みがあります。
  • チベット人に対する厳しい抑圧、強制的な同化政策、漢民族の移住、そして少なくとも200万人もの子供たちが再教育のために家族から引き離され、政府運営の寄宿学校に入れられたことなどが挙げられます。

中国共産党の‌‌「毒された」民族政策‌‌は、潜在的な民族的復讐の基盤となる深い恨みを生み出しました。

体制崩壊後のシナリオでは、米国とその同盟国は、‌‌「民族的暴力と政治的報復、そして内戦を阻止するための努力を主導」‌‌する必要があります。これは、少数民族を含む中国国民が平和に暮らせる安定した中国への秩序ある移行を促すものです。

この目標達成のためには、‌‌多角的なアプローチ‌‌が求められます。

  • ‌‌過去の不正義への対処‌‌: チベットや新疆のような地域における抑圧の度合いは大きく異なるため、単一のハイレベルな対応ではなく、‌‌「異なる歴史的または地域的な委員会」‌‌が必要となる可能性があります。市民社会組織は人権文書化において「素晴らしい努力」をしており、これは貴重な情報源となり得ます。
  • ‌‌緊急の具体的な措置‌‌: 米国は、すべての政治犯および宗教犯（新疆の再教育施設や香港の収容者を含む）の即時釈放、新疆における強制不妊手術と強制堕胎の停止、子供たちの家族への再会、閉鎖された礼拝施設の再開と独立した運営許可、中国共産党の教化・再教育の終了、そして少数民族言語を含む言論の自由と情報の自由な流通を確保すべきです。
  • ‌‌民族自決の支援‌‌: 香港、新疆、チベット、内モンゴル、寧夏などの地域は、強化された自治権を持って中国に留まるか、独立を宣言するか、あるいは近隣国との合併を検討する（例えば、内モンゴルとモンゴル共和国、福建省と台湾）かの選択に直面するでしょう。米国は、ソビエト連邦崩壊時に用いられたものと同様の、‌‌「国民の意思」と米国の政策ガイドライン‌‌に基づいて、これらの地域の‌‌「独立を支援し助言する」‌‌準備をすべきです。これらのガイドラインには、民主的原則に合致する自己決定、既存の国境の承認、民主主義と法の支配の支持、人権および少数民族の権利の保護、国際法および義務の尊重が含まれます。米国はまた、‌‌新しい主権国家を迅速に承認し‌‌、国際機関への加盟を促進すべきです。
  • ‌‌複雑な問題への対応‌‌: 新疆における漢民族に対する恨みや、チベットにおける中印国境紛争などの未解決の国境問題といった、困難な課題が存在することが認識されています。ダライ・ラマの「中道政策」（チベットの独立ではなく意味のある自治を求める）も注目されていますが、中国共産党の圧力がなくなった場合にこの見解が維持されるかは不確実です。

全体的な目標は、「少数民族を含む中国国民と平和的に共存する、安定した中国への秩序ある移行」です。

真相究明と和解プロセス​

AI

崩壊後の中国における「緊急の課題（短期）」というより大きな文脈において、情報源は、‌‌真相究明と和解プロセス‌‌が国内の安定と秩序ある移行を確保するための極めて重要な課題であると議論しています。これは、共産主義体制下の約70～80年間にわたる「嘘と虚偽」に満ちた統治によって生じた‌‌心理的・歴史的な傷‌‌を癒し、社会が前進できるようにするために不可欠であるとされています。

具体的には、以下の点が挙げられています。

真相究明と和解プロセスの必要性​

  • 中国は「長年抑圧されてきた政権であり、あらゆる種類の問題、傷跡、制度上の欠陥を抱えており、世界の他の地域にとっても非常に危険である」ため、安定化のためにこれらの問題に対処する必要があります。
  • 文化大革命中の死者数、天安門事件での死者数、COVIDの真の起源など、「多くの事柄を明るみに出す」必要があります。このプロセスを通じてのみ、社会はその「心理的・歴史的な傷を癒し、前進できる」と述べられています。
  • この和解プロセスは、体制崩壊後の「ごく短期間」における「差し迫った課題」の一部として捉えられています。

課題と潜在的なリスク​

  • ‌‌歴史的虐待の広範さ‌‌: 大躍進（少なくとも3,000万人の死者）、文化大革命、天安門事件、新疆ウイグル自治区での人道に対する罪（ジェノサイド）など、数えきれないほどの人権侵害と残虐行為が中国共産党（CCP）の統治下で行われてきました。これらはヤンアン整風運動、長春包囲戦、反革命分子鎮圧、反右派運動、チベット蜂起、法輪功弾圧、臓器収奪、そして近年では公民社会、労働者権利運動、弁護士に対する弾圧（709事件）や香港における国家安全法など、多岐にわたります。これらの膨大な被害にどこから手をつけるべきかという課題があります。
  • ‌‌強力な反対派の欠如‌‌: ポスト共産主義国家における移行期の正義に関する研究では、共産主義時代およびポスト共産主義期における政権と反対派の関係が、清算の範囲とペースに強く影響すると指摘されています。中国国内には、ナワリヌイのような「真に組織化された反対派」が存在せず、また「政治的多元主義の経験も少ない」ため、本格的な清算を推進する勢いが弱い可能性があります。
  • ‌‌表面的または形式的な清算のリスク‌‌: 歴史的に、各王朝は前の王朝を否定的に描く傾向があり、CCP崩壊後の清算も「非常に表面的、あるいは形式的なもの」になるリスクがあります。また、「社会をより民主的な社会へと変革するための社会変革を伴わない」報復的司法に焦点が当てられるリスクも指摘されています。

真相究明と和解プロセスへのアプローチとリソース​

情報源は、これらの課題に対処するための具体的なアプローチと利用可能なリソースを提案しています。

  • ‌‌異なるレベルの委員会設置‌‌:
    • ‌‌高レベルの委員会‌‌: チリの例のように、「人権侵害を評価するための高レベルの委員会」を設置し、時間経過と共に発生した全ての政治的残虐行為を調査することが重要です。
    • ‌‌地域的・地方的委員会‌‌: 中国の広大な規模と、河南省や山東省とチベット自治区や新疆ウイグル自治区のような地域で「抑圧の度合いが大きく異なる」ことから、「異なる歴史的または地域的な委員会」を設ける必要があると提案されています。これにより、より深いレベルでの「対話と真実の語り」が可能になるとされています。ルワンダの例（国際刑事裁判所、国内裁判制度、地方委員会）のような多層的なシステムが有効である可能性が示唆されています。
  • ‌‌責任者の特定と公表‌‌:
    • 直ちに対処すべき「即座の虐待」があり、これには過去の虐待、例えば毛沢東政権下で死亡した「6,000万から7,000万人に対する正義」の問題が含まれます。
    • 共産党は秘密組織であり、そのメンバーを公表しない性質がありますが、新たな政府が自らを防衛するためには、「1億人を超える党員を特定し、その個人ファイルもある程度公開されるべき」であり、これは「直ちに行われるべきこと」とされています。PAP（人民武装警察）や情報機関の要員の特定も、「新たな統制を確立するためには不可欠」であると述べられています。
  • ‌‌公民社会の役割と資料の活用‌‌:
    • 中国の公民社会は長年にわたり「人権に関する素晴らしい資料化の努力」を行ってきました。これには、新疆ウイグル人権裁判、新疆被害者データベース、ウイグル移行期正義データベース、強制臓器収奪に関する中国裁判、天安門事件の犠牲者の物語、中国人権擁護者ネットワーク（CHRD）の良心の囚人データベースなどが含まれます。
    • これらの文書化された情報は、真相究明の貴重な情報源となります。
    • 公民社会組織は、ウイグル人、チベット人、香港人、本土の中国人の間の「非公式な集まりや対話」を通じて同盟を形成しており、その連帯と活動が活用できるでしょう。
    • 中国には「公民社会の歴史家の偉大な伝統」も存在し、彼らの地方レベルでの文書化の努力も参考になります。
    • 国連システムを人権文書化の強力なツールとして活用することもできます。
  • ‌‌宗教コミュニティの関与‌‌:
    • 宗教コミュニティは「コミュニティへの深いコミットメント」と「回復的司法への重視」を持っており、ポスト共産主義社会における対話に貢献する可能性があります。
    • ダライ・ラマ法王はチベット人のための「平和、安定、民主主義」の重要な声であり、彼の役割は極めて重要であるとされています。
    • 投獄されているイルハム・トフティのような知識人も、移行期の正義をもたらすために活用されるべきです。

即座の具体的な措置​

広範な真相究明と並行して、米国とその同盟国は、民族的復讐を防ぐために、以下の即座の措置を確保すべきです。

  • すべての政治犯および宗教犯の即時釈放（新疆の再教育施設、香港の収容者を含む）。
  • 新疆における強制不妊手術と強制堕胎の停止。
  • 国家運営の寄宿学校に強制収容された子供たちの家族への再会。
  • 閉鎖された礼拝施設の再開と独立した運営の許可。
  • 中国共産党の教化・再教育の終了、そして少数民族言語を含む言論の自由と情報の自由な流通の確保。
  • 教科書の改革、特に「西側との闘争は和解不能である」といった習近平の言葉を教える内容の削除。

全体として、情報源は、共産主義後の中国において、過去の不正義に対処し、社会の傷を癒すための真相究明と和解プロセスが、短期的には国内安定を確保し、長期的には平和で安定した中国への秩序ある移行を可能にするために不可欠であると強調しています。

緊急措置（ビジネス・金融）​

AI

中国崩壊後の米国と国際社会の対応というより大きな文脈において、情報源は‌‌緊急措置（ビジネス・金融）‌‌についていくつかの具体的な提言を行っています。これは、秩序ある移行を確保し、世界経済への混乱を最小限に抑えるための「差し迫った課題」の一部として捉えられています。

以下は、情報源が述べている主要な点です。

緊急措置（ビジネス・金融）の必要性​

  • 中国は「長年抑圧されてきた政権であり、あらゆる種類の問題、傷跡、制度上の欠陥を抱えており、世界の他の地域にとっても非常に危険である」ため、崩壊後の安定化は極めて重要です。
  • 体制崩壊後の「ごく短期間」における「差し迫った課題」として、安全保障やバイオラボの確保などと並んで、ビジネスや金融に関する措置が挙げられています。
  • 中心となる考え方は、‌‌「迅速に行動し、可能な限り中国の資産を押収する」‌‌ことです。

具体的な提言​

  1. ‌‌中国の資産の差し押さえと凍結‌‌:

    • 中心が消滅し、誰が国を運営しているのか、あるいは誰も運営していない可能性がある「混乱」の状況において、米国は‌‌中国の資産を自国でできるだけ速やかに差し押さえ、凍結し始めるべき‌‌だとされています。
    • これは世界の金融市場の混乱を防ぎ、安定化を図るために重要だとされています。

  2. ‌‌米国内の中国系銀行への対応‌‌:

    • 中国の銀行は世界最大規模ですが、崩壊シナリオでは「事業が停滞し、縮小する」ため、‌‌経営破綻する可能性が高い‌‌とされています。
    • これは、中国政府が流動性を提供できなくなり、貸出債権の価値が劇的に下落するためです。
    • 米国は、これらの銀行が米国に保有する資産を差し押さえる必要があります。預金者を保護し、中国国内の勢力による銀行の略奪を防ぐため、‌‌通貨監督庁と連邦預金保険公社（FDIC）が迅速に行動することが重要‌‌だと強調されています。
    • 他国との連携は理想的ですが、‌‌迅速な対応が最優先‌‌されるべきであり、米国が適切な措置を講じれば他国の規制当局もそれに追随するだろうと述べられています。これは非銀行金融機関にも適用されます。

  3. ‌‌外貨準備高の管理‌‌:

    • 中国が保有する米国の財務省証券は、名義人を通じて保有されている分を含めると「相当な額」に上るとされています。
    • 中国の安定性が悪化した際のパニックを防ぐため、米国はこれらの‌‌外貨準備高を差し押さえ始めるべき‌‌だとされています。
    • 財務省は英国当局や租税回避地の当局と連携し、中国国内の勢力が外貨準備高を利用して世界の金融市場のボラティリティを高めることを防ぐべきだとされています。

  4. ‌‌スミスフィールド・フーズの所有権の差し押さえ‌‌:

    • 米国最大の豚肉生産企業であるスミスフィールド・フーズは中国の企業に所有されており、COVIDパンデミックの際に中国の利益を優先して米国に不利な販売を行った事例が挙げられています。
    • 情報源は、中国の政治システムが崩壊する危機において、米国が‌‌スミスフィールドの所有権を差し押さえるべき‌‌だと主張しています。これは、「良い危機を無駄にしてはならない」という考えに基づいています。

  5. ‌‌米企業の中国からの退去‌‌:

    • 米国大統領は、1977年国際緊急経済権限法（IEEPA）や1917年敵性国との交易法（TWEA）の下で権限を行使し、危機において‌‌米企業を中国の土壌から撤退させるべき‌‌だとされています。これは米国の経済の生命線である企業を保護するためです。

  6. ‌‌米国民の避難‌‌:

    • 中国にいる米国民の避難は非常に困難であり、特に内陸部にいる人々は困難を極めると指摘されています。
    • 「二人のマイケル」（カナダ人の拘束事件）の事例を挙げ、中国政府が自国の義務を完全に無視し、危機時には状況がさらに悪化すると警告されています。
    • 大統領は、‌‌米国民を中国の土壌からできるだけ早く退去させる権限を行使すべき‌‌だとされています。

  7. ‌‌一帯一路（BRI）プロジェクトへの影響‌‌:

    • 中国国民は一帯一路プロジェクトに不満を抱いており、中国の政治システムが崩壊すれば、これらのプロジェクトへの支持はなくなるだろうと予測されています。
    • 多くの一帯一路プロジェクトは経済的に実行不可能であり、‌‌北京からの支援がなくなれば失敗する‌‌だろうとされています。
    • 中国は「世界の残りの地域での存在感を大幅に縮小する」だろうと予測されています。

  8. ‌‌中国通貨（人民元）の状況‌‌:

    • 人民元は資本勘定で国際的に交換可能ではなく、中国政府の通貨管理への信頼が低いと指摘されています。
    • 危機時には、強制的な人民元の使用を促す中国政府の計画がなくなるため、‌‌人民元の利用がさらに減少する‌‌と予測されています。人民元は「失敗国家」の通貨と見なされる可能性があり、中国の銀行・金融システムは「破綻」すると予測されています。

避けるべきこと​

  • 米国は、中国の危機において、‌‌「どちらかの勢力を一方的に支援しようとすべきではない」‌‌と強く警告されています。過去に米国大統領が中国共産党（CCP）の特定の派閥を支持した例（ニクソンと毛沢東、ブッシュと鄧小平、クリントンとWTO加盟）は、結果的に「我々の民主主義を打倒しようとする政権を救った」と批判されています。
  • 特に危機の初期段階（最初の48時間から1週間）では、米国は「そのゲームに参加すべきではない」とされています。情報が不足している状況で干渉しようとすれば、「事態を悪化させる」可能性があるためです。米国は、自国の企業や市民を保護することに注力し、状況が落ち着くまで干渉を避けるべきだとされています。

全体として、情報源は、中国共産党崩壊という「緊急の課題」において、ビジネス・金融面での‌‌迅速かつ断固たる行動‌‌が、米国の利益と世界経済の安定のために不可欠であると強調しています。

米国在住中国人（学生、国民）と日米関係​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）崩壊後の米国と国際社会の対応という文脈において、米国在住の中国人（特に学生や国民）に関する問題は、米国自身の緊急課題として認識されており、これが日米関係に間接的に影響を与える可能性があります。

ソースは、主に以下の2つの側面からこの問題に言及しています。

  • ‌‌米国在住中国人（学生、国民）に関する課題‌‌

    • 中国共産党崩壊というシナリオにおいて、米国は「‌‌現在米国に滞在している277,000人の中国人学生やその他の中国国民をどうするのか‌‌」という緊急の課題に直面するとされています。
    • この問題は、「中国が友好国になるのか敵国になるのか分からない」という不確実性から、「‌‌崩壊初日から考えなければならない非常に重要な問題‌‌」であると強調されています。
    • より広範な文脈として、中国国内にいる米国市民の避難の困難さ（特に内陸部）が指摘され、中国政府が危機時に外国人を危険にさらす可能性が強調されています（「二人のマイケル」の事例）。このため、米国大統領は「‌‌できるだけ早く米国人を中国の土壌から退去させる‌‌」権限を行使すべきだとされています。

  • ‌‌日米関係への影響と協力の必要性‌‌

    • ソースは、中国共産党の崩壊が起きれば、「‌‌世界ははるかに平和な場所になる‌‌」との見方を示しており、特に米国が「安定と統制を再主張するために介入する」ならば、その傾向は強まると述べています。これは、共通の脅威が減少することで、日米同盟を含む既存の同盟関係にとって間接的に有益であることを示唆しています。
    • 米国はすでに、「中国が台湾を侵攻した場合に同盟国が何をすべきか」について問いかけているものの、この対話を「‌‌中国共産党が崩壊した場合に同盟国が何をすべきか‌‌」に拡大する必要があると提言されています。これは、日米を含む同盟国間での事前の調整と計画の重要性を示唆しています。
    • ポストCCP中国における米国の政策は、「‌‌独立、民主主義、言論の自由、信教の自由、その他の基本的‌‌な人権を推進する上で極めて重要となる」とされています。この目標は、「自国民（少数民族を含む）や近隣諸国と平和な、安定した中国への秩序ある移行を促す」ことで米国の国益に資すると説明されており、これは地域の安定を望む日本にとっても利益となります。
    • 米国は、「‌‌インド太平洋の同盟国と協力して‌‌」、新たな独立国家を支援し助言する準備をすべきだとされています。具体的には、ソ連崩壊時に使用されたような、「自己決定、既存国境の承認、民主主義と法の支配の支持、人権と少数民族の権利の保護、国際法と義務の尊重」といった原則を指針として採用することが提唱されています。
    • 米国は、これらの新たな主権国家を迅速に承認し、外交関係を樹立し、「‌‌残りの中国や世界からの受け入れを支援‌‌」すべきであり、また「地域防衛同盟にも参加させるべき」とされています。これは、新たな地域秩序構築において、日本が重要な役割を果たす可能性があることを示唆しています。

‌‌日米関係に関する重要な問題点としての総合的な理解‌‌:

ソースは、米国在住の中国人に関する直接的な政策が日米関係に具体的にどう影響するかについては明示していません。しかし、米国が中国共産党崩壊後の「混乱」を管理し、安定と民主的移行を促進するための全体的な戦略の一環として、国内の中国人に関する政策（例：学生の取り扱い）を位置づけていると解釈できます。

日米関係にとっての重要な問題は、以下の点にあると考えられます。

  • ‌‌地域安定化への共同責任‌‌: 中国の崩壊は、日本を含むインド太平洋地域に未曾有の不安定をもたらす可能性があります。米国は、この混乱を管理し、平和的な移行を促すために、日本を含む同盟国との‌‌緊密な連携と調整‌‌が不可欠であると認識しています。
  • ‌‌価値観に基づく新秩序の形成‌‌: ポストCCP中国のあり方（民主化、人権尊重など）は、日本の国益にも直結します。米国はこれらの価値観を推進する方針であり、これは日本が共有する価値観と合致するため、‌‌日米間の協力はより深化する可能性‌‌があります。
  • ‌‌安全保障上の連携の継続‌‌: たとえCCPが崩壊しても、中国が保有する軍事力（核兵器を含む）や地域での影響力は消滅しないため、日米同盟は、この新たな状況下での‌‌地域安全保障の維持‌‌に引き続き重要な役割を果たすでしょう。特に台湾を巡る問題や、地域防衛同盟への新たな主体（例：独立した香港や新疆）の統合は、日米の安全保障協力の新たな焦点となる可能性があります。

米国在住中国人の取り扱いは、米国の国内問題でありつつも、人道、経済、安全保障の側面から、米国の全体的なポストCCP中国戦略の一部を構成します。この戦略が、同盟国との連携を重視し、地域安定を志向するものである限り、日米関係にとってもポジティブな影響をもたらす可能性が高いと言えるでしょう。

失敗へのヘッジ戦略​

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中国共産党（CCP）崩壊後の米国と国際社会の対応というより大きな文脈において、「失敗へのヘッジ戦略」は、CCP崩壊が予測通りに平和的かつ建設的な結果をもたらさなかった場合の、最悪のシナリオに備えるための計画として議論されています。

この概念は、特にリック・フィッシャー氏によって提示されています。

  • ‌‌ヘッジ戦略の目的‌‌: フィッシャー氏は、CCPの崩壊が「‌‌完全に否定的で、さらに悪い結果‌‌」につながる可能性に備える必要性を強調しています。これは、米国と同盟国が、新政権が地域的・世界的な平和と安定に貢献しない場合、または、CCP崩壊によって一時的に棚上げされたとされる「‌‌CCPの世界的覇権のアジェンダを倍加‌‌」させるような事態に逆戻りする可能性がある場合に備えるものです。

  • ‌‌戦略の内容‌‌: ヘッジ戦略は、「民主主義国が準備すべき‌‌最低限の戦力‌‌」として具体的に提示されており、もし積極的な介入と新指導部との対話が失敗した場合の「‌‌恐ろしい未来‌‌」を避けるためのものです。その構成要素は以下の通りです:

    • ‌‌核弾頭‌‌: 約6,000発の米国配備核弾頭と、ヨーロッパによって配備される2,000発。
    • ‌‌戦術核弾頭‌‌: 約6,000発。
    • ‌‌海軍戦力‌‌: 約1,200隻の艦隊、20の空母打撃群。
    • ‌‌航空戦力‌‌: これらを支援する空軍。
    • ‌‌宇宙領域‌‌: 低軌道、地球-月システム、そしてそれ以遠における優位性を争う能力。

  • ‌‌戦略の位置づけ‌‌: このヘッジ戦略は、CCP崩壊後の混乱を管理し、‌‌平和的な移行と民主主義、人権の推進‌‌を目指す米国と同盟国の第一の希望的シナリオに対する‌‌最終手段‌‌と位置づけられています。フィッシャー氏は、この戦略は「迅速な介入、新指導部との関与、前向きな方向へ動くよう説得するための積極的な努力、それを助けるための最小限の支援」によって「回避できる負担」であると述べています。

要するに、ソースは、中国の崩壊が必ずしも望ましい結果をもたらすとは限らないという現実的な懸念を持っており、もしそうなった場合に米国と同盟国が自国の利益と地域の安定を守るために、‌‌非常に大規模な軍事的備え‌‌が必要となる可能性を議論しているのです。これは、CCP崩壊後の世界が「はるかに平和な場所になる」という希望的な見方がある一方で、最悪の事態にも備えるという、慎重かつ現実的なアプローチを示唆しています。

ロシアとの関係がより複雑である可能性​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）崩壊後の中国に対する「外国の敵対勢力の介入防止」というより大きな文脈において、ソースは‌‌ロシアとの関係がより複雑である可能性‌‌について言及しています。この複雑さは、歴史的な背景、現在の地政学的状況、そして潜在的な国境問題から生じています。

主要な議論点は以下の通りです。

  • ‌‌中国の対ロシア領土主張の可能性‌‌:

    • リック・フィッシャー氏が引用した、中国のインターネット上で広まった「‌‌今後50年間に中国が戦うべき6つの戦争‌‌」という表現には、‌‌ロシアから失われた土地を取り戻すための戦争‌‌が含まれていました。これは、CCP崩壊というシナリオにおいて、ポストCCP中国がロシアに対して領土的な主張を再燃させる可能性があることを示唆しています。
    • 朝鮮と中国の国境が「半世紀以上もの間、数百マイルも両方向に移動してきた」という指摘があり、中国側には民族的な朝鮮人が居住していることから、「‌‌北朝鮮がその土地の一部を取り戻す時期だと判断する‌‌」可能性が示唆されています。これは直接ロシアには言及していませんが、歴史的な国境問題がCCP崩壊後に再浮上する可能性を示唆しており、中国とロシアの間にも同様の過去の国境問題が存在する文脈を想起させます（ただし、ソース内で具体的な中露国境紛争が再燃するとは明言されていません）。

  • ‌‌ロシアの現在の中国への依存‌‌:

    • 中国の崩壊が北朝鮮やロシア、イランに与える影響について問われた際、専門家は「‌‌ロシアが中国の助けなしにウクライナ戦争を遂行できるか？ 私はそうは思わない‌‌」と述べています。これは、現在のロシアがウクライナ戦争において中国からの支援に依存していることを示唆しており、CCPの崩壊がロシアの軍事力と国際的な立場に深刻な影響を与えることを意味します。この依存関係は、CCP崩壊後のロシアの行動を予測する上で複雑な要素となります。

  • ‌‌米国の対ロシア関係の難しさ‌‌:

    • CCP崩壊後、米国の敵対勢力が中国社会に足がかりや影響力を得ようとする可能性について問われた際、ランディ・シュライバー氏は、「‌‌今日これが起こったとしたら、我々はプーチン氏と多くの異なる問題を抱えており、金正恩氏とは何の連絡も取れていない‌‌」と述べ、これらの関係を再構築することの難しさを強調しています。
    • 特にロシアに関しては、「‌‌もし明日起こったとしたら、プーチン氏との関係を考えると、あまり楽観的ではない‌‌」と述べられています。これは、現在の米露関係が極めて悪化しているため、CCP崩壊という混乱期において、米国がロシアに対して建設的な会話を持ち、ロシアが中国に不当な影響力を行使しようとするのを阻止することが非常に困難であることを示唆しています。

  • ‌‌過去の「ロシアカード」の可能性‌‌:

    • シュライバー氏は、「‌‌ロシアカードを中国に対して使うという幻想‌‌」については「あまり期待していない」としつつも、「‌‌中国で崩壊が起これば、もしかしたら‌‌」と、将来的な可能性を完全に排除してはいません。これは、米中ソ冷戦期の歴史的経緯を踏まえ、将来的に米露関係が改善した場合に、何らかの形で中国に対する外交的レバレッジとしてロシアが機能する可能性も、非常に低いながらも考慮されていることを示唆します。

これらの点から、ソースはロシアとの関係が、単なる敵対関係ではなく、歴史的な領土問題、現在の相互依存、そして悪化した米露関係という複数の層によって‌‌より複雑なもの‌‌であると認識していることが分かります。CCP崩壊という未曽有の事態において、ロシアの行動は予測不可能であり、米国はロシアが中国の混乱に乗じて影響力を拡大しようとする可能性に備えつつも、現在の米露関係の悪さから、その対応が困難になるという複雑な課題に直面すると考えられています。

ファイル（Dossier）制度​

AI

全体主義体制の解体というより大きな文脈において、ソースは‌‌ファイル（Dossier）制度‌‌を、中国共産党（CCP）の支配を維持するための重要な抑圧的ツールの一つとして議論しています。この制度の解体は、ポスト共産主義中国における安定と民主化に向けた移行の不可欠な要素であるとされています。

ソースがファイル制度について述べている点は以下の通りです。

  • ‌‌ファイル制度の性質と目的‌‌: ファイル制度は、‌‌個人の経歴、家族の背景、政治的背景など、あらゆる情報を記録し、追跡するための非常にイデオロギー的なシステム‌‌であると説明されています。これは、市民が「赤」（良い）か「黒」（悪い）かという毛沢東時代の階級区分を想起させ、地主の家族出身者などに対する「多世代にわたる懲罰」という概念にまで遡ることができます。
  • ‌‌抑圧ツールとしての位置づけ‌‌: ファイル制度は、監視国家、社会信用システム、戸口制度（hukou system）と並んで、CCPによる社会統制の主要な手段である「抑圧のツール」として明確に位置づけられています。これは、政府が社会の全体を支配しようとする全体主義システムの文脈で機能します。
  • ‌‌解体の必要性‌‌: CCP崩壊後の中国では、このファイル制度を含む「抑圧のツール」の解体が、喫緊の課題として挙げられています。これは、‌‌「70年、80年近くの共産主義支配は嘘と虚偽に満ちている」‌‌という認識に基づき、‌‌「真実と和解のプロセス」‌‌を通じて社会の心理的および歴史的傷を癒し、前進するために不可欠であると考えられています。
  • ‌‌透明性の確保‌‌: リック・フィッシャー氏は、CCP崩壊後の新政府が1億人を超える党員を特定し、その「人事ファイルをある程度公開」することの必要性を強調しており、これはファイル制度の透明化と関連する議論です。これにより、不正行為に責任を負うべき人々を特定し、正義を実現するための第一歩となると述べられています。

要するに、ソースはファイル制度を、CCPが市民の生活を深く管理し、イデオロギー的支配を維持するための強力なメカニズムと捉えています。この制度を解体し、過去の抑圧と不真実を明らかにする透明性を確立することは、ポスト共産主義中国がより正常で平和な国際社会のメンバーへと移行するために、避けては通れない課題であると論じられています。

具体的な地域​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）崩壊後の「地域別課題と方針」というより大きな文脈において、ソースは、巨大で複雑な中国が直面する潜在的な地域ごとの多様なシナリオと、それに対する米国と国際社会の対応について具体的に議論しています。CCP崩壊後の移行を安定させ、地域と世界に平和をもたらすためには、‌‌各地域、地方、人口統計のニーズに合わせた多様な政策が必要‌‌であると強調されています。

以下に、ソースが言及している具体的な地域とその課題、および提案される方針をまとめます。

1. 自治地域（特別行政区および民族自治区）​

これらの地域は、CCP支配下で最も抑圧され、不満を抱える少数民族の故郷であり、CCP崩壊後には独立または強化された自治の道を模索する可能性が高いとされています。米国は、各ケースバイケースで、地域の人民の意志と米国の利益を反映したガイドラインに基づき、独立を支持すべきだと考えられています。

  • ‌‌香港‌‌:
    • 民主主義への強い情熱を持ち、CCPから独立を求める最前線に立つと予想されています。
    • 最近の民主主義の経験、高い人間開発水準、活気ある経済力から、‌‌移行が最も成功する可能性が高い‌‌と見られています。
    • 「基本法」という「暫定的な国家憲法」を持ち、多党制の経験と立法・司法インフラがあります。
    • 米国は香港の独立への移行を政治的、法的、外交的に支援すべきです。
    • 香港は、将来的に中国本土との連邦制を望まない可能性が高いと指摘されています。2020年の国家安全法以降、2,000人の政治犯が投獄されています。
  • ‌‌新疆ウイグル自治区‌‌:
    • CCPによる‌‌ジェノサイド‌‌を経験しており、中国との信頼関係が皆無であるため、‌‌最初の機会に中国からの独立を求める‌‌ことは間違いないとされています。
    • ウイグルのディアスポラ組織は平和的な民主的移行を提唱しています。
    • 課題としては、多くの漢民族居住者への反感や、国境を越えたイスラム過激主義の影響が挙げられています。
    • 米国は新疆の将来の地位決定を強力に支援すべきです。
    • 子供たちが国家運営の寄宿学校に強制的に入れられています。
  • ‌‌チベット‌‌:
    • CCP崩壊後、独立主権を追求するか、強化された自治権を持って中国に留まるかの2つの選択肢に直面すると見られています。
    • チベット人口の多くがチベット語を話さなくなっており、CCPの強制同化政策の下で多くの漢民族が移住させられています。
    • 少なくとも100万人のチベット人の子供たちが家族から引き離され、国家運営の寄宿学校でチベット人としてのアイデンティティを教え込まれないようにされています。
    • ‌‌ダライ・ラマ‌‌は平和、安定、民主主義の重要な声であり、彼の「中道政策」（独立ではなく、実質的な自治を追求）が成功の鍵となる可能性があります。
    • 米国は、チベット仏教徒の指導者選定権を支持し、ラサに領事館を置くべきです。
    • インドとの国境紛争の解決も課題となります。
  • ‌‌内モンゴル、寧夏、広西‌‌:
    • これらの地域も北京の強制的な文化的同化政策に基づいた不満を抱えており、独立に投票する可能性があると予想されています。
    • もし独立を投票した場合、米国はこれらを支援すべきです。
    • 内モンゴルはモンゴル共和国との統合を検討する可能性もありますが、モンゴル側は内モンゴルの規模や民主主義の経験がないことから、懸念を抱く可能性も示唆されています。

2. その他の地域と国境問題​

  • ‌‌広東省と福建省‌‌:
    • 広東省は、CCP崩壊後によりリベラルな傾向を示す可能性があり、香港の影響を受けるかもしれません。
    • 福建省は台湾との合併を模索するシナリオも提案されています。
  • ‌‌満州（東北部）‌‌:
    • 独立運動の兆しがあり、「満州市民証」を発行し始めているグループもあると指摘されています。
    • 歴史的に、中国の分割案（李登輝の7分割案など）にも登場しています。
  • ‌‌地域主義の再燃‌‌:
    • 長年の集権化政策にもかかわらず、中国では「どこの省出身か」を尋ねる習慣が残っており、地域主義が根強く存在しています。
    • CCP崩壊後には、新疆、チベット、香港だけでなく、上海独立党や満州独立運動のように、‌‌さまざまな地域で独立運動が活発化する可能性‌‌が示唆されています。
    • ただし、過去数十年のナショナリズムの推進と標準中国語の普及により、地域主義が弱まっている可能性もあります。
  • ‌‌国境全般と人口流出‌‌:
    • 中国は世界で最も多くの国（14カ国）と国境を接しており、多くの国と国境の定義や合意に問題を抱えてきました。
    • CCP崩壊後、‌‌大量の人口流出（難民危機）‌‌が発生する可能性があり、近隣国に大きな影響を与えることが懸念されています。
    • 米国は人道的な支援と、国境を接する国々との外交を通じて難民を受け入れるよう促す必要があるものの、この大規模な事態を完全に防ぐことは困難であると認識されています。
    • 北朝鮮と中国の国境は、歴史的に何百マイルも移動しており、CCP崩壊後に北朝鮮が一部の土地を取り戻そうと考える可能性も示唆されています。また、「今後50年間に中国が戦うべき6つの戦争」という中国のインターネット上の「流行歌」には、ロシアから失われた土地を取り戻すための戦争が含まれていたという話も引用されています。

3. 移行期の政策と課題​

  • ‌‌「真実と和解のプロセス」‌‌:
    • CCPによる70〜80年近くにわたる支配が「嘘と虚偽に満ちている」ため、‌‌「真実と和解のプロセス」‌‌を通じて、文化大革命や天安門事件、COVID-19の起源など、過去の事実を明らかにし、社会の心理的・歴史的傷を癒すことが不可欠であるとされています。
    • このプロセスは、地域レベルでも行われる必要があり、地域ごとの弾圧の差を考慮した委員会が考えられています。
  • ‌‌抑圧ツールの解体‌‌:
    • 監視国家、ファイル（Dossier）制度、社会信用システム、戸口（hukou）制度など、CCPの‌‌全体主義的な抑圧ツール‌‌の解体が、ポスト共産主義中国の安定と正常な国家への移行に不可欠です。
    • ただし、この解体プロセスは、地域によって不均一に進む可能性があると予測されています。
  • ‌‌元党員と治安部隊の扱い‌‌:
    • 約1億人いるCCP党員への対応が課題であり、ナチス・ドイツの非ナチ化プログラムや東欧の共産党員の事例が比較に挙げられています。
    • 党員の「人事ファイル」を公開し、責任を負うべき人物を特定することで、‌‌透明性を確保‌‌することが重要とされています。しかし、過去の例（イラクのデバアス化）から、治安部隊を完全に解体することの危険性も指摘されています。

全体として、ソースは、中国の崩壊がもたらすであろう地域的な課題の多様性を認識し、米国と国際社会が、‌‌画一的ではない、地域の実情に応じた柔軟かつ迅速な介入と支援‌‌を行うことの重要性を強調しています。特に、独立を求める民族自治地域への支援と、国内の安定化および民主化への移行支援が、ポストCCP中国の未来を形作る上で不可欠であると議論されています。

中国共産党の崩壊は現実的か？（党自身が毎日懸念）​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）の崩壊が現実的であるかというご質問は、この議論の核心をなすものです。ソースは、CCPの崩壊が単なる理論的な演習ではなく、‌‌CCP自身が日々懸念している現実的な可能性‌‌であることを強く示唆しています。

以下に、ソースが中国共産党の崩壊の現実性について述べている点をまとめます。

  • ‌‌会議の目的自体が崩壊の可能性を前提としている‌‌：この会議は、「中国共産党の潜在的な崩壊を考慮した戦略的展望の演習」であり、「国際社会がこの可能性に備えているかどうかを検証する」ために設計されています。これは、崩壊が無視できないシナリオとして認識されていることを示唆しています。
  • ‌‌CCP自身の「偏執的な」懸念‌‌：マイルズ・ユー博士は、CCPが‌‌「毎日体制崩壊の偏執的なシナリオの中で生きている」‌‌と述べています。彼らのあらゆる行動、特に米国との国際的な関わりは、「体制がいかに脆いか」という懸念に根ざしています。CCPは、米国が中国国民を鼓舞して体制変革を促すような行動をしないことを望んでいます。
  • ‌‌「断層線」への恐怖‌‌：CCPは、人権や体制変革といった問題が「共産党が日々心配している断層線」であると考えています。
  • ‌‌過去の事例からの示唆‌‌：ポンペオ元国務長官の証言として、彼が中国国民に直接語りかけようとした際に、中国側が最も動揺したことが挙げられています。これは、北京の指導部がいかに不安定であるかを示しています。また、ポンペオ氏が「中国人民と中国共産党は全く異なる概念である」と述べた際に、中国側が「暴れまわった」ことも、彼らが体制変革を恐れている証拠とされています。
  • ‌‌全体主義体制の性質‌‌：「全体主義体制は、事前の警告なしに崩壊する可能性がある」と指摘されています。同時に、体制が延命する可能性も言及されており、このことは、‌‌予測不可能性‌‌を強調しています。
  • ‌‌内部の亀裂‌‌：CCPの崩壊は外部からは遠いシナリオに見えるかもしれませんが、‌‌内部には多くの亀裂が存在する‌‌ため、現実的な可能性として認識すべきだと述べられています。
  • ‌‌統治モデルの脆弱性‌‌：中国は、習近平による政治的中央集権化の努力により、課題に適応できない「脆い統治モデル」を抱えており、経済見通しの不確実性や国際環境の敵対性といった複雑な構造的変化に直面しています。
  • ‌‌国民の支持の脆弱性‌‌：CCPの支持率が80～90%に達するという世論調査の結果は、表現の自由や情報の自由がない環境下では「偽の数字」であり、信用できないと強く指摘されています。もし国民が土壌汚染、食品安全問題、汚職問題、党幹部の資産公開などの「良い情報」に触れれば、支持は「極めて迅速に低下する」可能性が示唆されています。また、「寝そべり」（Tanping）や「腐らせる」（Bailan）といった国民の受動的な抵抗の兆候も、体制への無関心と不満を示しています。
  • ‌‌「危険な風に乗る機会」‌‌：中国のことわざ「危機は危険な風に乗る機会である」が引用されており、米国が自由と正義を推進する努力が、関係者全員にとって有益な機会となる可能性があるとされています。

これらの点から、ソースは、中国共産党の崩壊が、党自身が最も恐れる内部の脆弱性と外部からの圧力の組み合わせによって、いつ起こってもおかしくない現実的なシナリオであると考えていることが分かります。そのため、‌‌米国と国際社会は、この可能性に積極的に備え、対応策を練るべきである‌‌というメッセージが強く打ち出されています。

先例：ソ連共産主義の突然の崩壊​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）の崩壊が現実的かという議論において、ソ連共産主義の突然の崩壊は、複数のソースで‌‌重要な歴史的先例として、また比較対象として‌‌繰り返し言及されています。この出来事は、今後の中国の潜在的な移行シナリオを考える上で、教訓と課題の両方を提供しています。

ソースがソ連共産主義の突然の崩壊について述べている点は以下の通りです。

  • ‌‌課題としての認識‌‌: ハドソン研究所のジョン・ウォルターズ氏は、ポスト共産主義中国の計画について、「ナチス・ドイツ、帝国日本、そして東欧におけるソ連共産主義の崩壊後の世界が直面したのと‌‌同じ種類の強大な課題‌‌について考えなければならない」と述べています。これは、ソ連の崩壊が国際社会にとって非常に大きな、かつ準備が必要な出来事であったことを示唆しています。
  • ‌‌予測の難しさ‌‌: マイルズ・ユー博士は、共産党体制の崩壊はいつでも起こりうるとしつつ、それが延命する可能性もあると述べています。リック・フィッシャー氏は、1980年代初頭の自身のキャリアの始まりにおいて、「ソビエト連邦共産党の終焉を想像する者はほとんどいなかった」と述べ、ソ連の崩壊が‌‌事前にほとんど予測されていなかった‌‌ことを強調しています。
  • ‌‌「望ましくない勝利」としての教訓‌‌: リック・フィッシャー氏は、元国防長官のボブ・ゲイツの言葉を引用し、冷戦の勝利を「‌‌特異なまでに喜ばしくない勝利‌‌」であり、「パレードはなかった」と表現しています。これは、勝利がもたらす複雑な課題や準備不足を示唆している可能性があり、CCP崩壊後の計画の重要性を対比させています。彼は、CCPが自滅的に崩壊した場合、それを「間違いなく祝うべき」であると述べています。
  • ‌‌平和的な移行モデル‌‌: ニーナ・シエ氏は、ソ連共産主義の突然の崩壊が「‌‌一発の銃弾も発することなく冷戦を終結させた‌‌」と強調しています。さらに、この崩壊は「何百万もの囚われの民を解放し、中央および東ヨーロッパに20の新しい共和国を形成させ、これらの共和国は歴史家によって‌‌おおむね平和的な移行‌‌と見なされる形で西側へと傾倒していった」と述べており、これを‌‌中国の目標‌‌と位置づけています。
  • ‌‌米国の支援と原則‌‌: ニーナ・シエ氏は、ソ連崩壊時の米国の方針が中国への対応の「確固たる基礎」となると見ています。ジョージ・H・W・ブッシュ政権がソ連解体の前夜に採択した5つの指針は、以下の通りです。
    • 民主的原則に合致する‌‌民族自決‌‌。
    • ‌‌既存の国境の認識‌‌。
    • ‌‌民主主義と法の支配の支持‌‌。
    • ‌‌人権および国内の少数民族の権利の保護‌‌。
    • ‌‌国際法および義務の尊重‌‌。 これらの原則は、新たな共和国が米国の協力と支援を期待できる根拠となったとされています。
  • ‌‌新興国家の迅速な承認‌‌: ニーナ・シエ氏によると、米国は1989年から1990年にかけて、東欧と中央ヨーロッパの新興国家を迅速に承認し、外交官を交換しました。チェコスロバキアの例では、共産党政権の辞任から、ヴァーツラフ・ハヴェル氏の大統領任命、そして自由選挙による承認までの流れが、‌‌数ヶ月という短期間で進行した‌‌ことが指摘されています。また、ブルガリアやルーマニアのように、‌‌改革された元共産主義者が指導者となるケースでも、米国は彼らを正当なものとして認めることを躊躇しなかった‌‌と述べられています。
  • ‌‌制度的継続性‌‌: ドン・クラーク氏は、ソ連の共和国や東欧諸国の憲法が、ソ連の支配下では「見せかけの存在」であったにもかかわらず、ソ連の支援が撤退すると「‌‌死から蘇った‌‌」かのように現実の存在となったと指摘しています。これは、既存の制度がたとえ形骸化していても、崩壊後に機能しうるという可能性を示唆しています。
  • ‌‌中国との相違点‌‌: ドン・クラーク氏は、東欧諸国が「ソ連からの外部の軍事的支援に依存していた」ため、それが失われると「急速に崩壊した」と述べ、‌‌中国にはこれに匹敵する外部からの軍事的支援がない‌‌ため、東欧とは異なる状況にあると見ています。そのため、ポーランドやチェコスロバキアで見られたような「政府と野党の間の交渉」は、中国では同じようには起こりにくいだろうと予測しています。
  • ‌‌真実と和解への示唆‌‌: ウィリアム・ニー氏は、ソ連崩壊後の旧共産主義諸国、特にソ連後の国家での経験が、中国にとって真実と和解の取り組みの参考に成り得ると述べています。しかし、中国には「組織された反対勢力が不足している」ため、これが「真実の究明への推進力が弱い」結果につながる可能性があると指摘されています。

これらの点から、ソ連共産主義の崩壊は、CCP崩壊後の世界を考える上で、‌‌平和的な移行の可能性と、それに伴う国際社会の役割、そして潜在的な課題‌‌の両面において、重要な示唆を与えていることが分かります。特に、米国の迅速な対応、新たな国家の承認、および民主主義と人権の原則の適用は、今後の中国へのアプローチにおける主要な要素として捉えられています。

大規模な難民流出の可能性​

AI

中国共産党（CCP）崩壊という長期的な課題の文脈において、ソースは‌‌大規模な難民流出の可能性‌‌について、それが差し迫った危険性であり、対応が必要な課題として議論しています。

  • ‌‌大規模な難民流出の可能性とその管理の困難さ‌‌:

    • マイルズ・ユー博士は、CCP崩壊後のシナリオにおいて、チベットや新疆などの地域での‌‌民族間の報復を防ぎ‌‌、国境を安全に保つ必要性に言及し、潜在的な人口移動への懸念を示唆しています。
    • ユー博士は、直接的に‌‌中国からの大規模な人口流出‌‌、特に国境を越えて近隣諸国への移動の可能性について質問を投げかけています。彼は、近隣諸国が「移民で溢れかえる」ことを防ぐために、人口を安定させる方法について懸念を表明しています。
    • ランディ・シュライバー氏は、この大規模な難民流出を防ぐことができるかという問いに対し、‌‌「できるとは思いません」‌‌、‌‌「止めるためにできることはおそらくあまりないでしょう」‌‌と答えています。彼は、この現象が‌‌「起こる可能性が高い」‌‌と見ています。
    • シュライバー氏は、中国の近隣諸国が、このような状況において‌‌「自らの国境を確保し、潜在的な移民（この場合は難民となるだろう）に対処する」‌‌ことになるだろうと述べています。彼は、ウクライナからの難民に対するポーランドの対応を例に挙げ、一時的な難民地位のための「最適な受け入れ国への誘導やチャネル化」の可能性を示唆しています。
    • 彼はまた、米国の国家安全保障会議の視点から、中国市民の出国を阻止することよりも、‌‌「彼らが安全に出国し、避難所と一時的な地位を得られるようにする人道的な努力」‌‌の方が優先されるだろうと述べています。そのためには、国境を接する国々との外交が必要になるとも指摘しています。

  • ‌‌中国国内での難民危機管理における治安部隊の役割‌‌:

    • シュライバー氏は、中国の治安部隊、特に人民解放軍（PLA）と人民武装警察（PAP）が、‌‌「難民危機が発生した場合、その管理においても役割を果たすだろう」‌‌と考えています。これは、国内の安定維持や混乱鎮圧における彼らの一般的な役割と関連しています。

  • ‌‌海外にいる中国国民と亡命政策の課題‌‌:

    • ゴードン・チャン氏は、中国からの大規模な人口流出の可能性に関連して、米国にすでにいる‌‌中国人留学生（現在の時点で27万7千人）を含む中国人国民をどうするのか‌‌という問題提起を行っています。
    • チャン氏は、中国が将来「友となるか敵となるか」が不明な状況で、米国が‌‌「亡命政策」‌‌を含め、この問題に「初日から」対処する必要があることを強調しています。これは、CCP崩壊後の不確実性が、米国の国内政策にも直接的な影響を与えることを示唆しています。

総じて、ソースはCCP崩壊後の大規模な難民流出は‌‌避けられない可能性が高い‌‌と見ており、国際社会、特に米国は、この人道的課題に備え、近隣諸国への支援と、自国の亡命政策の見直しを行う必要があると提言しています。同時に、中国国内の治安部隊もこの危機管理に動員されると予想されています。

情報源​

After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China | Hudson Institute

https://www.hudson.org/events/after-fall-planning-post-communist-china?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6k5Zu8zm3_4

動画概要欄​

6,600 views Streamed live on Jul 16, 2025 While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has weathered crises before, a sudden regime collapse in China is not entirely unthinkable. Policymakers need to consider what might happen and what steps they would have to take if the world’s longest-ruling Communist dictatorship and second-largest economy collapses.

Hudson Institute’s China Center will convene experts and policymakers to discuss the potential collapse of CCP authority in China. The event will examine the possibilities and analyze what steps the United States should take in the immediate aftermath to stabilize China’s political, economic, and social institutions. Finally, they will assess the forces required to shape China’s post-CCP future.

The conference will feature remarks from experts in military affairs, intelligence, economics, human rights, transitional justice, and constitutional governance, and include two moderated panels to discuss the larger implications of a potential CCP collapse on regional and global security.

文字起こし​

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(transcript 1of4)

（以下は "After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China | Hudson Institute" と題された講演動画の文字起こしです。長いので 4分割しています。 ）

Good morning and thank you for being here both in person and virtually. I'm John Walters, President and CEO of Hudson Institute. It is my pleasure to welcome you to today's conference hosted by Hudson's China Center on planning for post-communist China. This volume, which is available here in live and in person and available to you online, covers a number of the topics that will be addressed during our panels and others that are pertinent to this particular issue. (0:00:32)

After four decades of unprecedented economic growth and assertive global integration, PRC faces complex structural changes that cast doubt on the long-term sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party. These include an increasingly uncertain economic outlook, a more hostile international environment, a brittle governance model that can't adapt to challenges due to Xi Jinping's political centralization efforts. While the CCP has dealt with problems in the past, history has shown that those in those moments of rapid change, if we are unprepared, we often react too late. (0:01:13)

This conference is therefore an exercise in strategic foresight considering the potential collapse of the CCP, designed to examine whether the international community is prepared for this possibility. It is now my pleasure to turn things over to Dr. Miles Yu, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's China Center, to offer remarks and introduce the panels that will cover some of the topics in this volume. I recommend it very highly to all of you. Thank you. Miles? (0:01:40)

Thank you, John, for the remarks and opening this, the conference. And thank you for coming. And let me say something presidential. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Good morning. My name is Miles Yu, and I'm the Director of the China Center here. You know, we're often thinking about China as the number one national security threat, to this country, which is true. (0:02:16)

And that's the recognition by all political forces across the aisles. So China is a formidable adversary. That's the consensus. But a suddenly collapsed China could also prove to be very formidable as well, because China is a long repressed regime, with all kinds of problems and scars and institutional flaws that could be very dangerous to the rest of the world, too. (0:02:47)

So how do we find out a country that suddenly collapsed under us, over nearly 70 years of communist rule, and that will be sort of a peaceful, peacefully translating to a more normal country. And that's basically the task that we're thinking about a couple years ago, as a matter of fact, which resulted in the publication of this report that John indicated earlier. (0:03:15)

We have to think about the same kind of a formidable task that the world faced after, say, the regime collapse of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and even the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe. So each one of the cases, and we have to think about how to stabilize that regime first, that post-collapse regime, and how to deal with all kinds of issues. (0:03:40)

And then secondly, how to transition those societies into a normal sort of members of the international community. So this is basically on a much larger scale, because China is a huge, China is also a very complex country. You will see if in a scenario of a suddenly collapsed regime in China, you would have to deal with, first and foremost, I'm thinking about, say, how to prevent ethnic vengeance in places like Tibet and Xinjiang, and how to secure borders, how to secure the nukes and the bio labs, and how do we actually make sure that there will be some kind of truth and reconciliation process in China. Because the communist rule of nearly 70, 80 years is full of lies and untruth. (0:04:31)

How many people were killed during the Cultural Revolution? Who died in Tiananmen Square? How many? And what's the true origin of COVID? So there's a lot of stuff we have to uncover. And only through this process that the society can heal its psychological and historical wounds and can move forward. (0:04:45)

And also, ultimately, of course, how to change a totalitarian regime into a constitutional regime, which is sort of in compliance with the dream of China since the May 1st movement of 1919. That is, how to sort of place the premium on Mr. Democracy, and how to create a sort of constitutional rule in China to make China a nation that will be sort of responsible to its own people, rule with the consent of the people, and also at peace with its neighbors. (0:05:22)

So this is very important task, and we're going to talk about it. Of course, this is just the beginning of a long process. Hopefully, we're thinking more about what a post-communist China will be like, so that we will have a more sort of a stable and healthy transition to a future of that region, but also for the world. (0:05:49)

So today's conference, we're going to have two panels. The first part will deal with some of the sort of immediate tasks within, say, a very short period of time after the region's collapse, and security, and bio labs, all the things. The second one is more about the long-term religious issue and constitutional issue and tools of reconciliation. So in your program is the bio information of all our speakers, and we'll go basically, you know, with... we have seven speakers today, and we have two panels, and we'll go... so I'm not going to take much of a time to read the detail of the illustrious bio and careers of each speaker. (0:06:35)

But we'll go with... first with Mr. Randy Shriver, and then followed by the... Gordon, is that right? And then Rick Fisher, Mr. Fisher, and then we're going to go the second panel, which it will be... so it's very interesting because you print two sides, so you have to really turn to look at it. (0:06:57)

Anyway, it's in your program, so I'm going to basically, when the beginning of the second panel starts, I'll read the order in which the speaker will speak, right? First of all, let me turn the podium to Mr. Randy Shriver. Ready? Good morning, Myles. Thank you very much for having me and really impressed with this project and look forward to reading the report. (0:07:28)

This is sort of draft season. We had the Major League Baseball draft two days ago, NBA draft a few weeks ago. I'm what is called a player to be named later. I was asked just two days ago to pitch in for Chad Sabrazia, who is the real expert on this. But I really want to be part of this conversation. (0:07:48)

I think it's a conversation that should be much more robust, should involve more analysts and experts. I think for a long time, people wanted to avoid the question. It's too hard. It's too messy. It's too hard to know. Maybe it's even a little scary. But I also think people wanted to sidestep this question for a long time for political reasons. (0:08:14)

If you start talking about post-CCP, that means you don't buy into the notion that the CCP will be in power in perpetuity. And that is quite offensive to the communist leadership in Beijing. So I really am pleased to be a part of this and glad that Myles did ask me to participate. (0:08:32)

So I've spent a lot of my career looking at the security forces of China. So I thought I'd focus a bit on that. I think the role of the security forces broadly will be extremely important in virtually any scenario. Part of that is informed by history. There's very interesting history of the PLA activities during the Cultural Revolution, during Tiananmen, of course. (0:08:56)

And more recently, the People's Armed Police when it comes to domestic stability and security of critical infrastructure and the like. If you haven't read the history of the PLA during the Cultural Revolution, it is quite interesting. They played a role in quelling domestic disturbances when the Red Guards got too out of control. They played a role in protection of nuclear weapons facilities. (0:09:24)

In some instances at provincial local levels, they formed revolutionary governing councils that were entirely PLA because governance had become so difficult. (0:09:32)

So the PLA role in that post-period, if it is chaotic, would be very interesting to understand and unpack a little bit, partly because of the experience in Tiananmen where the PLA was used to put down internal unrest. The role of the People's Armed Police has been expanded and they've been better resourced. So the People's Armed Police created in 1982, but really post-Tiananmen 89, extremely robust investment in those forces. (0:10:11)

They number somewhere 500,000 or north of that when you include reserves and there's militia that have associations with the People's Armed Police. But of course, they've been the instrument more recently when you think of the Wukan village uprisings, 2011, it was People's Armed Police. When you think of Hong Kong even, deployment of People's Armed Police in Guangzhou to the border. (0:10:36)

So thinking about the role of the People's Armed Police, which is subordinate to the PLA. And that was made clear during reforms of 2018 that they report through the Central Military Commission. All of that will be very important, I think, to understand. When they do deploy for the purposes of dealing with civil unrest, natural disasters, et cetera, they do think about critical infrastructure protection. (0:11:04)

They do think about securing these facilities that Miles mentioned in his opening remarks, biolabs, weapons labs, and caches and the like. So I think one could expect that that would... and they train on that. So I think one could expect that the security forces would play that kind of role if the collapse and the post-collapse period was quite chaotic. (0:11:38)

The question is long term, do they splinter, do they fracture? What kind of role would they play going forward in a post-communist China? And I think the likelihood is that they don't splinter. There have been efforts during Xi Jinping's era to strengthen centralized control. And of course, at a very personal level, a lot of the purges were designed to have loyalty to the person, but really to the party and the central governing authorities. (0:12:06)

Partly informed by Tiananmen, where you might recall the security forces, PLA, wouldn't... the original deployment of Beijing area People's Liberation Army wouldn't fire on the protesters because these were their fellow members of the city and the community and friends wouldn't fire on friends kind of thing. So they've done a lot of reforms to prevent splintering and having split loyalties at the provincial level versus the central level. (0:12:39)

So I think it's quite likely that the PLA and People's Armed Police do hold together. And so the question then is, you know, what kind of role would they play? It seems to me that in the near term, the PLA still has that domestic stability role written into their mission statements and as part of their doctrine. So I suspect they'd be inward focused supporting domestic stability in whatever transition would be occurring. (0:13:18)

And I think the likelihood of a diversionary war or something of that like during a period of chaos is unlikely. But we shouldn't forget that this is a military that is essentially from 1996 on, built for regional contingencies, Taiwan first and foremost, but other regional contingencies, East China Sea, South China Sea, and it's built to take into account U.S. intervention in those contingencies. (0:13:46)

So post-96 is really in the Taiwan Strait crisis and the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers is really where this notion of anti-access area denial, A2AD, comes about. A2AD being an English term that we've put on the doctrine. But nonetheless, this is a military that has invested heavily. It's quite capable when it comes to operationalizing these regional contingencies and they very much have us in mind. (0:14:14)

A lot of their power projection is to deal with U.S. forward deployed forces or forces that might surge to the area. So as we think about a post-CCP PLA, I think whatever government comes into power is going to inherit a military that is two million plus strong, when you count reserves, built for power projection for regional contingencies, really built for taking in and seizing and holding Taiwan and dealing with the U.S. intervention in that. (0:14:49)

So I think that has to be taken into account in our planning, that this is a very capable military that doesn't go away, even if they're inwardly focused and dealing with domestic stability. (0:14:59)

When we think about potential outside threats, China is, of course, I think it's 14 countries border China, most in the world. At one time or another, they've had difficulty with defining and agreeing on their borders with many of these bordering countries. But there's not an obvious threat to the post-CCP China that would sort of want to come in and occupy parts of China, would want to have a heavy hand in determining the post-government, post-CCP government. (0:15:36)

So I think the notion of an outside threat in this period of transition would be pretty limited. I mean, there might be some opportunism on the Indian border, there might be opportunistic moves related to some of the disputed features in the South China Sea. But certainly it would be a high-risk endeavor to take on China on the Vietnamese border, on the Russian border, even in a period of domestic chaos. (0:16:07)

This is still a very capable military, still one that has trained for a variety of these contingencies for a long time. So I think really the lens that I would look primarily through is a security force, People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police, civil local police, militias, that would be focused on domestic stability, that would be focused on securing critical infrastructure, that would have an eye on potential threats, particularly border areas, but really would be looking to ride that transition out to a point where they could reestablish themselves as a regional, if not global power, and regain the initiative to think about how to operationalize these various contingencies. (0:16:55)

Now there is a big question hanging out there. The security forces, of course, are pledged, their loyalty is pledged to the party. It is a party army. They're not taking an oath to a constitution, to a country, it is a party army. So who do they, does that transition easily to post-CCP? I suspect it probably does, because again, the I think unlikely prospects of them splintering, of them dividing loyalties among regional, provincial leaders, I suspect they hang together and transition their loyalty and their extraordinary capabilities to whatever that post-CCP government is. And so I do think as the United States allies and others look at this as a possibility, our problems don't go away immediately. (0:17:55)

Our security challenges, certainly in the Indo-Pacific, I think would remain. It would be a matter of politics and diplomacy as to whether or not the threat picture would actually change over time, less so dealing with the PLA, unless they themselves were to make decisions about changing focus, reducing size, and I think my friend Rick is going to talk a little bit about that. (0:18:17)

But thank you again, Miles, for the opportunity to participate and look forward to the discussion. So, and I'll finally, for those, mostly for the benefit of those people watching online, I'm going to basically give you a sense of the order of speakers. So, Randy, thank you for those wonderful remarks. And then next speaker will be Gordon Chan, and he's a former consul to Paul Rice and Shanghai Partner and Baker and McKenzie, Hong Kong. And then following Gordon will be Rick Fisher, his senior fellow in Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment, and Strategy Center. And then that's the first panel. (0:18:57)

And the second panel will start in around 10.30 and will be, will start with Mr. Piero Tazi, who is the Staff Director, Congressional Executive Commission on China. And then followed by William Ni, he's the Senior Manager, Asia Regional Program, National Endowment for Democracy, NED, also known as NED. And then he will be followed by Ms. Nina Hsieh, who is my colleague here, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. And then the last of the list is Professor Emeritus, Don Clark, who's probably the most authoritative voice about Chinese law in this country. (0:19:39)

So he is Professor Emeritus, Georgia Washington University Law School. So that's the order of speaking. And so after each panel, we have a brief discussion of all the speakers. And then so now I turn the podium to Mr. Gordon Chan. Thank you, Miles. And thank you all for participating today. (0:20:13)

The question for me is simple to state. What do we do when China collapses? And of course, there's a lot on this to-do list. I'm going to talk about things that we should do. And maybe it's important, I'll talk about a few things that we probably shouldn't try to do in moments after a collapse. (0:20:41)

Now, there's a lot of things for us to do, as mentioned. I'm going to confine myself to business and financial matters for the most part. And I'm not going to hold you in suspense. So this is the summary. When China collapses, in other words, when the center is gone, I think that we should start to seize and freeze Chinese assets in our country as fast as we can. (0:21:13)

In this situation, where we don't know who is running the country, or perhaps nobody's running the country, this is a time when there's going to be chaos. There's going to be chaos in the global and financial markets, which means there's a lot of uncertainty. And it's important for the United States, as the ultimate guarantor of financial security around the world, for us to stabilize things. So where do we start? I'm going to start with the Chinese banks in the United States. Now, these banks are behemoths. They are the world's largest by almost every metric. (0:21:46)

And for instance, if we look at assets, a commonly used measuring stick, last year, the four largest banks in the world were Chinese. That's no surprise, because that's been the case now for a very long time. Those are what we used to call the big four. So in general, one could sort of think that in a Chinese collapse scenario, maybe these banks just chug along, you know, as usual. (0:22:17)

But that's pretty unlikely. It's unlikely for a number of reasons. So first of all, maybe some party in China who's vying for power thinks it's in his or her interest to try to cause turmoil for the rest of the world. Entirely possible. More likely, somebody who's vying for power wants to loot those banks in order to fund his or her ambitions with regard to China. But also, we know something else. (0:22:50)

And that is, in a collapsing situation, probably business in China starts to stall. It's reduced. And that means that's going to affect the banks as well. Now, Chinese banks are large, but they are also probably insolvent on a balance sheet basis. In other words, the assets that they are showing are probably not worth as much as they are reported. (0:23:17)

And that's because a lot of the loans that China, these Chinese banks have extended, are using international standards, are probably worthless or next to worthless. Now, whatever the situation is today, we know that the Chinese central government continues to make these banks viable by funding them. So it doesn't really matter. These banks are continuing to continue. But the point is, in a collapse, maybe the central government doesn't provide the liquidity or can't provide the liquidity. (0:23:50)

And indeed, in a collapse situation, the loan values on the books of these banks are going to fall dramatically. But the reason is that borrowers are not going to be able to continue business in all probability, which means they won't be able to pay back the banks, which means you have further erosion in their balance sheets. So what does the United States do in this situation? Well, it seems to me that the most important thing for us is to seize the assets in the U.S. Now, they're not big players in the U.S., but they do have depositors. (0:24:24)

And we need to make sure that those depositors are kept tall and that nobody in China is able to loot these banks or otherwise do something that would take away the assets that are available to American depositors. And that means the comptroller of the currency and the FDIC need to move fast. So earlier rather than later would certainly be my policy. (0:24:43)

We certainly don't want federal regulators to move after the damage has been done. This raises the issue of coordination. Do we coordinate with bank regulators in other countries? And ideally, of course, we would. But in this situation, when we're talking about rapid deterioration in China, probably time is of the essence. And so I would think that we would want to move sooner rather than later, even if that meant no coordination with others. (0:25:17)

And if we do things that make sense from a bank regulation point of view, I'm sure that bank regulators in other countries will follow our lead. And of course, what I've just said applies to the non-banking financial institutions in our country from China. The other big issue, of course, is the foreign exchange reserves. (0:25:42)

In April, the U.S. Treasury reported that China was holding $759 billion in American treasury obligations. The real number is probably higher because it is known that China holds treasuries through nominees in places like London and probably other locations as well. So we're talking about a substantial number. Now, our Treasury Secretary, Scott Besant, gave an interview to Bloomberg in April, and this was a time when there was some turmoil in the markets because of President Trump's tariffs. (0:26:14)

And the Treasury Secretary said, don't worry. Foreign companies are not dumping our obligations. And in any event, we have a big toolkit. And of course, that was right. But the point is, when you have a panic, and there will be panic when there are deterioration of the Chinese stability and the political system, then the question is, is our toolkit big enough? I think here again, we need to start to seize assets and the foreign exchange reserves. (0:26:46)

And one of the things that we probably need to do is to take a look at the treasuries that are held by nominees in other locations. So I would hope that the Treasury Department would be coordinating with the British authorities and with authorities in known tax havens to look out for disturbing activity, because we don't want some party in China using the foreign exchange reserves to increase volatility around the world. What about food security? (0:27:13)

Smithfield Foods, biggest pork producer in the United States, owned or generally controlled by Chinese parties. We know that during the COVID epidemic, that Smithfield was selling pork to China in circumstances where it looked like it made much more sense to sell to American parties. So we can see that China is using its ownership interest in Smithfield in a way that prejudices the United States. And I think that when there's a crisis in China, we should seize the ownership of Smithfield as well. (0:27:52)

I don't think that we should have ever allowed Smithfield to be owned by Chinese parties. But right now, we don't have the political will to take Smithfield back. But as that famous political theorist Rahm Emanuel once said, you never let a good crisis go to waste. And in this particular crisis of the disintegration of the Chinese political system, let's do the things that we need to do. (0:28:22)

On that topic, President Trump has authority. He has authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. He can even invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. What should he do with those powers? Well, I'd like to see him use that to force American business off of Chinese soil. It's important in a crisis to protect our companies. Our companies are a lifeblood of the American economy. (0:28:50)

Let's try to make sure that they are not disadvantaged by a political crisis in China. Also, there are evacuations of American citizens who work for those companies. Evacuations are always very difficult. Americans in China have continually ignored State Department advisories about the dangers of being in China. And indeed, in an evacuation, maybe the United States can do something about people who live on China's coastline. But it's certainly going to be very difficult for us to evacuate Americans in the central and western part of the country. Let's try and do something. Why should we try and do something? (0:29:26)

Well, the case of the two Michaels, the two Canadians who were grabbed in December 2018, is instructive. If you remember, the United States asked the Canadian government to detain Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou because of sanctions violations. The Canadian government did it, and in retaliation, China grabbed the two Michaels. And it just shows a complete disregard in Beijing for its obligations. (0:30:02)

And of course, this shows that China's willingness to endanger foreigners living on its soil. In a crisis situation, things will obviously be much worse. I'd like to see the President of the United States use his powers to get Americans off Chinese soil as soon as possible. The common thread here is acting fast and seizing Chinese assets when we can. (0:30:25)

A couple of things we shouldn't do, and here I'm going to diverge a little bit from the business and financial aspects. In a crisis in China, there will inevitably be people in the United States who say that we should try and help one party over another in China because it's in America's interest to do so. And indeed, American presidents have been playing Chinese politics for decades, yet we have not been very good at that game. (0:31:01)

And we have seen sometimes some pretty atrocious results where we favor one faction of the Communist Party over another. Especially in a crisis situation, in the first 48 hours, maybe first week of the disintegration of the Chinese political system, we definitely should not try and play that game. Related to this, I think that we could very well see an American president say, well, we've got to support the Communist Party in this crisis because it's the devil we know. (0:31:31)

And the idea would be we'd be doing this for stability reasons. Again, this is not something where we have been very good at. For instance, we've had three instances where an American president has rescued Chinese communism. Most famous one was 1972, Richard Nixon goes to Beijing in the middle of the Cultural Revolution and saves a Mao Zedong who looked to be in trouble. (0:31:56)

1989, George H.W. Bush saves Deng Xiaoping after the Tiananmen Massacre. You could even look at 1999, where a period of downturn in China, a period of doubt about the regime, Bill Clinton signs up a World Trade Organization deal to pave China's accession to that organization, which occurred in December 2001, just after his presidency. Now, one could justify what Nixon did. It was the Cold War. Americans felt that we were losing. (0:32:32)

We needed a friend, yes. But the other two instances, no. We rescued a regime that to this day is trying to take down our democracy. So in general, I don't think that we should be trying to play favorites in a Chinese crisis, to help a group that may or may not fulfill our wishes. And in any event, throughout history, we haven't been very good at this. Thank you very much. (0:32:58)

Well, thank you, Miles. Thank you, Hudson, for helping us to imagine a time in which the executioner's blade of the Chinese Communist Party is not hanging over the whole earth. The last time we faced such a threat, the beginning of my career in the early 1980s, there were few who would imagine the end of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I came to town expecting I would be working in government, fighting the Soviet Union for a long career. And I share the sentiment of Bob Gates, former Secretary of Defense, who in his 96th memoir remarked, and so the greatest of American triumphs, a triumph of constancy and purpose sustained over four decades at staggering cost, became a peculiarly joyless victory. (0:34:41)

We had won the Cold War, but there would be no parade. Well, having the Chinese Communist Party having basically, we hope, vanquished itself, collapsed from within, this is something that we definitely need to celebrate. And as we plan our way forward, we need to take stock of what we avoided, the world that the Chinese Communist Party was building toward, planning for, and ready to execute against all of us. (0:35:32)

The Chinese Communist Party and its security organs have been for the last 30 years and were building toward a position where they could deploy globally and become the preeminent military power on Earth and in the Earth-Moon system, and even further into dominating our solar system. We see the extent of this preparation, and until the collapse of the party, it was well underway. (0:36:15)

Thirteen group armies, combined arms group armies, a navy that was projecting toward well beyond 500 ships, 600 ships, projecting towards 10 carrier battle groups, eventual total nuclear-propelled carrier battle groups, an air force trending toward over 2,000 advanced 4th, 4.5, 5th, and 6th generation fighters, building toward 400 large Y-20 size military transports compared to the Americans who will never have more than 220. Civilian airliners competing with Boeing and Airbus and the military variants, very large tankers. (0:37:24)

A new PLA aerospace force formed basically about two years ago, dedicated to control of near space, low Earth orbit, the Earth-Moon system, to Mars, and beyond. A People's Armed Police of more than 600,000 troops that would probably be the lead in pacification on Taiwan, pacification of future democracies invaded the Philippines, the Ryukyu Island chain, and a militia that, according to some Chinese sources, claims at least 8 million personnel and has both maritime and air components. (0:38:13)

The maritime component, for example, is now building up to a fleet of 80 roll-on, roll-off, pure car, truck carriers. These are the huge car carriers that you can see pulling into while leaving Baltimore Harbor. Eighty of those ships all at once can move at least 160,000 troops. That exceeds the troop carriage that we witnessed on D-Day. And they could turn around and in two or three days do it again, if they're assaulting Taiwan or New Zealand, other areas in South Pacific, or onto Latin America, where China has tried to stoke a revival of the Falklands, spent the last 15 years trying to stoke a revival of the Falklands War. All of that power projection, thankfully, is on hiatus because of the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. And the wars that we would have faced. (0:39:34)

Back in 2013, there was a Chinese internet ditty that was making the rounds. Six wars China must fight in the next 50 years. Now, it was widely circulated. It was not taken down by the censors. So it had some kind of tacit approval, at least to prepare Chinese opinion for the wars coming, starting with Taiwan and ending with the war to take back lands lost to Russia. Now, of course, six is a small number, doesn't yet include the wars that will follow beyond the Asia-Pacific into establishing dominance in the Middle East, securing greater, more intimate political control in Africa, and of course, securing control over Latin America. In addition to the North Pole, the South Pole. This is something that was also put on hiatus by the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. And look, we can chronicle the vast vast factory that has been established to process Uyghurs in China, prior to that, Tibetans, and that sector will be available to process Taiwanese, Japanese, Filipinos, and myriad other conquered people. (0:41:22)

We've seen earlier this year the revelation of the construction of a brand new headquarters, 10 times the size of the Pentagon, the center of the party PLA global hegemony. (0:41:32)

So first order of business following the collapse of the CCP is to secure the military and to help the new government become secure. What do we do? Well, my suggestion, big taxpayer-funded suggestion, would be to create a reconstruction corps, a division, maybe 10,000 trained, language-qualified individuals who could be deployed both to Beijing and throughout the country to serve as advisors and eyes and ears, to make sure that the democracies are just as informed about potential threats to the center as that center is engaged to convince it to undertake a path of reform. (0:42:45)

Additionally, the democracies should also consider what it would take to make sure the party, the PLA stays in its barracks, essentially pay them not to revolt. Now, that's not, of course, a guarantee, but in as much as some estimates hold that about 30 percent of the PLA budget, roughly 70 to 210 billion works out, we're approaching a temporary subsidy that roughly amounts to what the democracies, Europe and the United States, are giving to Ukraine to fight its war against Russia. Is it something we can afford? Big question, but at least that gives us a ballpark for what we may be facing if we want to exercise that policy tool. (0:43:55)

And our leverage for deploying these tools will be buy-in by the new government to our great suggestions for how it can relate to the world anew. And I've just made my brief list denouncing hegemonic goals, destruction of democracies, goals of nuclear superiority, territorial claims against neighbors, cyber war, cyber espionage, foregoing hegemony in outer space. Convince the new government can buy into these new directions, then the ability to offer advisors to assist a real transition away from communism and subsidies to help keep the military in their barracks, on their bases, becomes an attractive exchange. (0:45:09)

Now, furthermore, restructuring the security sector. In essence, I suggest having the conventional forces. China will still require a military. Keeping those motivated, intelligent individuals employed in some way also contributes to stability. The nuclear forces, however, are a particular problem. And here, I would suggest we should be expecting a large, a high level of stability, a requirement for a high number of nuclear weapons in a basically a three-way, an attempt to create a three-way balance between Russia, China, and the United States. And that should be balanced, of course, by a three-way pursuit of national missile defenses to essentially cancel out the offensive weapons and strengthen the appeal of negotiated limitations going forward. (0:46:41)

Space offers a special area for channeling competition in a positive direction. The Chinese space sector is already as advanced as anybody's and is propelled by deep space ambitions. In 2013, their dominant aerospace company announced, we just spent the last three years devising a 100-year program to occupy the solar system. That's a commendable ambition. Should the new government buy into transparency in most military realms and transparency in space, then prospects for a positive cooperation with China to the moon, to Mars, and beyond becomes possible. Now, finally, I examine the burden of failure. (0:47:49)

If we're not able to convince the new government to adopt a positive, nonthreatening, nonviolent relationship with the Earth and a projection, nonviolent projection in space, we will be facing a China motivated by great and dangerous emotions, a potential PLA-controlled China that will redouble the agenda that was put on hold by the collapse of the CCP. So there is a necessity to consider a hedging strategy. (0:48:48)

What if the collapse leads to something completely negative and totally worse? Then I suggest a sort of minimum force that the democracies should be prepared to gather, starting with about 6,000 American nuclear-deployed warheads, 2,000 deployed by Europe, 6,000 theater nuclear warheads, a combined naval force of about 1,200 ships, 20 carrier battle groups, and air forces to support that and the ability to contest dominance in low-Earth orbit, Earth-Moon system, and beyond. (0:49:35)

It's a burden that I hope we can avoid by quick intervention, engagement with the new leadership, an aggressive effort to convince them to move in a positive direction, to offer minimal supports, to help that along. Because if we fail, it will be a terrible future. And I'll stop there. Thank you, Miles. We have time for maybe some audience or some questions. (0:50:33)

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（以下は "After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China | Hudson Institute" と題された講演動画の文字起こしです。長いので 4分割しています。 ）

Thank you very much. Three of you bring very, very unique perspectives on the challenging tasks ahead. In a scenario, I just got a text while I think Rick was speaking. He said, Miles, dream on. You are the only one who's talking about collapse, how realistic it is. You know, the funny thing is, you know who else is thinking about the regime collapse every day? It's the CCP itself. (0:50:59)

Every day it lives in paranoia. Everything they do, every international engagement with the United States is about how fragile the regime is. They want us to not do that to inspire Chinese people to basically to change the regime. So this is a very serious thing. Totalitarian regime can collapse any time. (0:51:18)

They can prolong also as well. So it's not entirely sort of unrealistic in a way. If the Communist Party thinks about it all the time, then so should we. So let me go back to the question. You know, in the case of say East Germany, West Germany, when East Germany collapsed, the world expected West Germany would take care of a big chunk of that sort of stabilizing and transforming the communist regime. (0:51:52)

And now similarly, you have North Korea, South Korea scenario, right? People would expect South Koreans would take care of a lot of things if the regime collapsed in North Korea. In the case of China, you say, oh, you know, Taiwan, but you know, Taiwan is tiny, small, right? China is big. So the question for you, Randy, is what's Taiwan's role in stabilizing and transforming the Chinese society after the scenario of regime collapse? Should there be some kind of international efforts like a UN sponsor, some enterprises over there? Yeah, it's an interesting question. (0:52:34)

Because of course, from 1949, I guess to the present, if you actually read their party platform, the Kuomintang has talked about being the rightful heir to post-imperial China. And so for years they talked about eventual unification once China reformed and all that. But I think that's largely manufactured. And it's a legacy party position. And the phenomena of Taiwanization of Taiwan, which was inevitable when you looked at sort of the composition of Taiwan, how many were actual ethnic mainlanders, how many were indigenous and Taiwanese. So I think the sentiment for being the rightful heir and coming in and helping govern greater China is a little less than meets the eye. (0:53:21)

I think Taiwan would likely, in fact, go in the other direction. They would explore the possibility of an independent identity, even pushing it even further, and maybe even de jure independence, maybe not on day one, week one. But I think they'd be inclined to go in that direction before they'd go in the direction of this is our problem to solve, and we have a role in governing China given our legacy claims. (0:53:46)

I'm sure Taiwan would have an interest in stability and certainly want to see mainland China come under some control of a responsible governing authority and address the potential threats from that new government. And so is there a role somewhere given language capabilities, given historical affinities among some Taiwanese? Sure, but I think they are likely to see it as not their problem. (0:54:24)

Okay, great. I would just add, this is also a marvelous opportunity today for the United States to make the point that an independent Taiwan is the best thing for a post-communist China. Ensuring that it exists as this comprehensive university of how to have transitioned from at least authoritarianism and to conduct a sort of ethnic Chinese pluralistic democracy would be essential for the mainland to make the same transition. And making that point, advancing it, helps to create not only an interest in a transition in China, but also an interest in not going to war against their ethnic relations in Taiwan. Yeah, it's true. (0:55:20)

I mean also the Taiwan experience itself is a very powerful message, right? People say the traditional society cannot re-transition to a democracy. (0:55:26)

Well, Taiwan's traditional Chinese language, you know, Confucian society has transformed into a vibrant democracy, and that's a very powerful message. I think Taiwan's model is probably inspirational as well as material to impact the post-communist scenario. Second question, Gordon, to you. You know, the Chinese population is very resentful of the fact that the Chinese government, the CCP government, has spent tens of billions, even hundreds of billions of dollars on Belt and Road initiative to develop some projects in other countries, while the Chinese population is pretty much in poverty. (0:56:12)

So you mentioned about all these measures to be taken immediately, freezing Chinese assets, you know, Smithfield, all these things. What about the widespread Chinese projects globally, the BRI, Belt and Road initiatives, all the projects? Would it be nice to just sell them off, get the money to the new government? Yeah, first of all, you're absolutely right. (0:56:34)

The Chinese people don't like Belt and Road, and it would seem to me that when you have a Chinese political system disintegrating, there's going to be no support for many of these projects. Remember what China did was, it was building the stuff that the private sector didn't want to touch. In other words, stuff that was economically unviable, which means essentially that these projects will fail once it no longer has support from Beijing. And Beijing has been pulling back support for many of these projects, and they've been a bit left abandoned. So I think we're going to see much more of that. (0:57:03)

You know, and when Rick talked about the Chinese military, I'm not sure the Chinese people are going to want to have as big a military as it currently has. And you're going to start to see, I think, a lot of these assets start to rust away. Maybe not Soviet style, where they're selling off aircraft carriers, but nonetheless, there's going to be a real pullback in ambitions. (0:57:28)

Because the Chinese people say, well, why don't I have good schools, and why don't I have this and all the stuff that you've been talking about, Miles? So clearly, there's going to be a China which is much smaller footprint in the rest of the world, even if it does have an ability to project power beyond its borders. (0:57:49)

Yeah, okay. Rick, I have a question for you. You mentioned about all those measures over there. Now, one thing I found is very interesting is that the CCP has a membership of 100 million. What are we going to do with them? Right? You cannot put them all in jail. And so, in the, say, for example, in the immediate aftermath of Nazi Germany's demise, we have a denazification program. (0:58:17)

And in, say, Eastern Europe, you know, people figure out, you know, membership of the Communist Party in places like Czechoslovakia or Poland, who are then actually were sort of informants for government. So, in other words, there's a very deep soul-searching about those people who join the party, and either they are the willing executioners of the party, or they join the party for some other reasons other than ideological. (0:58:38)

So, how do you solve the problem? Well, first and foremost, we have to, you know, understand that the CCP, like most Communist parties, is a secret organization. It does not reveal its membership. (0:58:55)

You do not talk about party business. Probably the only public aspect of the party that is sort of out there, people know, is you have to pay dues, pay dues every year. So, from one perspective, Miles, one of the first and most essential measures for the new government to take if it wants to defend itself from this, you know, unprecedented army of a hundred million plus, you have to identify them. (0:59:36)

You have to identify them to the world. Personnel files have to be made public to some degree. And this is just the beginning. Clearly, there will be abuses that have to be immediate abuses that have to be confronted. And the issues of the historical abuses, people who, you know, simply justice for the 60 or 70 million who died under Mao. Who were those people? And what does the new government, what does China owe to them? These are ways in which some measure of an international advisory effort can be very helpful. (1:00:32)

But this is sort of just the beginning. But it has to be done immediately. Who are the hundred million? Who are they? And what were they responsible for? And what measure of justice do they deserve? That's just the beginning. Yeah, so I think this will be covered by the second panel. One of the speakers will talk about this. I don't think the membership was that very secret. (1:01:00)

Remember, during the height of COVID, somebody leaked the entire membership list of a Shanghai Communist Party branch. Hundreds of thousands of them. So in other words, getting a membership is not that easy. Yes, there is some kind of undercover nature of that. So Gordon, I have a question for you. The issue about China's finances there, one of the major issues is the nature of the Chinese currency, renminbi, RMB. It's not internationally convertible. (1:01:39)

It's also sort of a stabilizing factor in the national finance system. What do you deal with the post-communist scenario in terms of Chinese currency? Well, the Chinese currency, as you point out, is not convertible on the capital account. On the current account, it is supposedly convertible, but in times of crisis, it isn't. And so you have a currency which Beijing would like it to be more... today, you have a Beijing that wants it to be more acceptable around the world and more used around the world, but it really isn't for a lot of reasons. (1:02:14)

And people just don't trust China's management of its own currency. So if you're talking about a crisis situation, I think that today, people will use the renminbi because there are central government plans which are relentlessly implemented to force countries to use renminbi. In a crisis, those plans go away. So you're basically... I think you're going to see a currency which is going to be used even less just because people are going to say, oh, that's China. China's a failed state. (1:02:42)

So therefore, why do we want to hold a currency which we didn't even like in good times? So why are we going to hold it now? And I think you're going to see a lot of that when you... today, you have the Chinese banks. People want to do business with the Chinese banks because it's China. There's going to be less of that as well. (1:03:05)

So I think we're going to see an implosion in the Chinese banking and financial systems and a currency which is even less used than it is today. (1:03:10)

Okay. Either implosion or explosion, and either way, is going to be a major issue. You want to say something? Yes, Maz. Sorry. I just wanted to add a new thought to why you would want exposure. Taking... the commissar core of the PLA is public to some extent. And it would be very useful to know who those people are. (1:03:43)

But who are the intelligence organs in the intelligence services, in the police services, the PAP? Knowing who those people are would be almost essential for a post-communist government to assure or begin to build a new level of control. Randy, I have a question for you. So imagine this. In the scenario we're talking about, there might be a huge exodus of human population. (1:04:17)

So you mentioned that China is the country that has the most landed borders, 14 of them, more than anybody in the world. How do we sort of prevent a massive exodus of the Chinese population across the border to neighboring countries? Not that it's not really justified, but just to think about how to stabilize the population so that the neighboring countries would not be sort of overfilled with the immigrants. (1:04:44)

Would there be some... what would be a major, corrective measure to prevent that from happening? I don't know that we can. And I think it would be up to each individual country to secure their own border and deal with potential immigrants. In this case, they would be refugees or they'd be... That's right. Yeah. And I think if you look at other examples, other recent examples, Ukraine, the response of countries like Poland have been quite positive for Ukrainians and the country. (1:05:25)

So perhaps there's a way to funnel or channel into the best host country for temporary refugee status. But I don't know that if this is crisis and chaos and I'm sitting in the National Security Council, I'm not sure on my long list of things to do, preventing Chinese citizens from leaving is very high. (1:05:45)

I think you'd want some humanitarian effort to ensure they can leave safely and have refuge and temporary status. And that's going to require diplomacy with those border countries. But I think it's going to happen. I think it would likely happen. And there's probably not much we can do to stop it. But can I relate it back to the previous question too? You know, when you talk about denazification, when you talk about post-imperial Japan, the reality is it was fairly limited and that most of the institutions remained in place and most of the people showed up to work on the following Monday as a former Nazi or a former... And in Japan, it goes all the way to the emperor, right? I mean, we didn't even remove the emperor, right? So I think Rick's comment about transparency is exactly right. (1:06:31)

But I think when you look at what you do with that information and the extent of purging... You know, we have another example with de-Bathification, which, you know, disbanding the military, de-Bathification, which I think was a mistake to the extent that we went so deep into the system to remove people. We had a lot of angry unemployed people, but we also had institutions that couldn't function. (1:06:54)

And so I think related to, you know, if the PLA is going to play a role in stability and quelling any domestic disturbance, the PLA, the People's Armed Police, would probably also have a role in managing a refugee crisis if it came about. And so I think with the transparency, we have to have some deftness in how we deal with that or it wouldn't be us, it would be the follow-on government. (1:07:20)

I think de-Bathification is probably the idea is good, but the mistake is to dismantle the Iraqi army and set it loose. (1:07:27)

And that is, in my view, is the mistake. I'm not sure it's a good idea, but... Just a related issue on your question is, like, what is our asylum policy? And the reason why I think about this is because my dad was studying in the United States, got his master's in civil engineering during the Chinese Civil War, and a generous America allowed him to stay. (1:07:47)

So I'm probably a little bit biased in this, but the question is, well, what do we do with, let's say, 277,000 Chinese nationals who are students in our universities at this very moment? I mean, what do we do with other Chinese nationals in our country? And that's going to be a really important question because we don't know if China is going to be a friend or foe. (1:08:07)

So this just raises all sorts of issues, but it's something that we're going to have to think on day one. What are we going to do with the Chinese who are here? That's true, that's true. Let's just turn to the audience for any questions. We have a few minutes left. Yeah, please. You, yes. This whole talk that's been going on this morning has been on the basis that this party's collapsing. (1:08:47)

Is that actually happening now, or is it basically just a theoretical exercise about what would happen if the party collapses? I'm just trying to figure out. Do you have clues or any type that the Chinese government is weakening in some way? I'm just wondering. Thanks. Okay. Well, thank you for the question. That's a question probably on everybody's mind. (1:09:11)

We're not exercising how the regime is going to collapse and why it's going to collapse. We're just saying, hey, this is almost like a political war game, right? So you'd say, what if in the scenario, the scenario of the regime collapse? Now, you ask a very good question. Are there any impetuses for the regime to collapse? As I say, if you look at the Chinese Communist Party, how they conduct their business every day, they live in this paranoid scenario of regime collapse every day. (1:09:38)

I mean, Zhu Wenji asked everybody to read, you know, Tokyo's Anshan regime. I know. And then you look at Xi Jinping, the way he reacted to Biden, to Trump. There are certain areas he's absolutely paranoid about. That is, human rights, regime change, all the issues, right? So because those are the fault lines that the Communist Party worry about every single day. (1:10:06)

So regime collapse, it sounds very remote from outside, but from within, there are a lot of cracks that could come in. So what we're doing here today is to exercise the possibilities, not reality. Well, O'Myles, your colleague, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, said the one thing that got the Chinese most upset when he talked to them about a range of issues was when he tried to talk to the Chinese people. (1:10:31)

And he said this in his July 23, 2020 speech at the Nixon Center, where he said the Chinese just could not deal with him when he was talking about discussing things directly with the Chinese. And so they are very, very insecure in Beijing, as you point out. Insecure is a nice word. I thought paranoia is probably a better one. (1:10:47)

Seriously. I mean, even dated earlier, in October 2019, when Secretary Pompeo mentioned in one of his speeches, he mentioned very casually, he said the Chinese people and Chinese Communist Party were totally different concepts. The Chinese weren't berserk, because they fear about people that might change the regime. So what I'm saying is, it is remote, yet it is a possibility. So we'll see. All I'm thinking about is we got to get ready for the contingency. (1:11:20)

Thank you so much for the very insightful conversation, and stimulating too. My name is Yuko Mukai, a non-resident fellow, Project 2049. My question is about how, so let's say this scenario happens. What would be the impact, not on the region, but more for the rest of the world? Like, for example, like North Korea, what's going to happen to them, to Japan, U.S.-Japan alliance, and Russia, Iran? And I'm very curious about your analysis on that. (1:12:01)

Thank you. How many hours do we have to answer that question? Oh my gosh. Go ahead. Well, you know, you have to take it country by country, but I think North Korea, which at least before its recent arms trades with Russia, was getting 90% of its external trade was with China. And a lot of that was aid. So you could see a North Korean regime start to fail. (1:12:25)

The North Korean regime starting to fail would probably do something terrible in the region. You know, Russia, would it be able to prosecute the Ukraine war without China's help? I don't think so. Would Iran be able to continue its assault on Israel without China's support? Again, I think we have a much more peaceful world once the Chinese regime is sort of out of the way, as you know, as Rick was talking about. (1:12:54)

So I think the world becomes a lot better place, especially if the United States moves in to reassert stability and control, which we'd have to do, I think. Something we don't want to do, and certainly don't, you know, many people in America don't want to do today. But the world, if we don't do that, could go in very bad directions. And so I think you'll see a much more peaceful world as the U.S. moves in and China moves out. (1:13:15)

Yes, we're in a... and we've begun to pointedly ask our allies what they might do in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. I think the conversation should be expanded. What will our allies do in the event of a collapse of the Chinese Communist Party? We'll go this way and then... Yes, good morning. (1:13:48)

Thank you all for your very insightful remarks. My name is Ian Everhart with the Institute of World Politics. My question is about the role of the internet in all of this, because when the Soviet empire collapsed, the internet was still in a very primitive state and very few Soviet subjects had access to the internet. Whereas, I don't know if there's really historical precedent for what would happen when the great firewall collapses or is pierced because the CCP has been lying for the last hundred years. (1:14:17)

And so it would just be a flood of information. There's already a very active Mandarin ecosystem on the internet. I mean, Dr. Yu regularly gets hundreds of thousands of views when he goes on Taiwanese and other overseas platforms. So what role do you see the internet playing in this regime change situation? (1:14:36)

What, if any, role does the U.S. government have in this new situation? Thank you. Well, in any real revolution, the first order from around the table is who's going to go out and seize the means of communication. So any post-CCP order would naturally place that at the top of their to-do list. And assuming they're having done so, then they certainly have choices to make. (1:15:28)

Do we take down the great firewall? Do we let a billion voices flower and the such? And if that indeed happens, then so much will take care of itself. But having the people on hand that can make clear to the new dispensation that this is something that they must do immediately is a paramount consideration for our side. Yeah, if you look at Miles' point and the point that's been underscored by others up here about the level of paranoia, they've studied the Arab Spring and the role of social media. (1:16:09)

They've studied the colored revolutions in Central Asia, and they understand the importance of this, which is why they go to such lengths to control content when it comes to social media, internet- based communications. Now, it's interesting. The way they do it is not to completely clamp down on everything. And they target, in particular, anti-Xi Jinping, anti-CCP sentiment. But there are all kinds of examples where netizens go crazy over one issue or another, and they sort of let it fester for a while as long as it's not directed at criticism of them. (1:16:49)

So there is the potential if the entity that's controlling for one thing, don't criticize the CCP, is gone, then it could be sort of a free-for-all, and it would be really contingent upon a new government to get a hold of that in some sense. But I also think in terms of preparing all the things that Rick said we should be doing, that Gordon said we should be doing, we better have a social media strategy to promote those things. (1:17:20)

You know, the Chinese citizens are very sophisticated consumers of propaganda and of messaging from the CCP. So much so that, in fact, they often believe the rumor before they believe what their government is putting out in a crisis, whether that be natural disaster or whatever. So we better be in that space. And I don't necessarily want to bring current events into this question, but I think we are pulling back on some of the tools that would be helpful to us. (1:17:50)

In shaping that before the crisis, but really critically important after the crisis and the chaos. To follow on that thread, which is excellent, you know, internet is a very powerful tool. It could be a tool of repression and chaos. It could also be a tool of peace and stability. So in other words, you know, in the case scenario we're talking about, there could be some kind of rumors going on and to destabilize the situation. (1:18:25)

So it's very important to have a voice of truth from somewhere, some central authority and say, hey, listen, there's no American black hands here and there. There's no sort of food crisis here and there. (1:18:36)

So there must be some kind of truth to calm down the soul in the scenario of a collapse. Because then you might have a lot of displaced population and who basically would have no aim but creating chaos. Thank you. I'm a Uyghur, so therefore I'm very interested to know what will happen to the ethnic minorities like Uyghurs and Tibetans in such a scenario and what they should do. (1:19:16)

And what would be the policy or attitude of the new regime, which after post-communist would be toward the Uyghurs? So I think that question will be reserved for the next panel, which will be dedicated to issues like that. But thank you for the question. Lady next to you. Hi, thank you again for the panel. I'm Grace Drexel from the Congressional Executive Commission on China. And I was wondering, is it really possible for the U.S. to not pick winners and stay out, especially with such large business interests in China? For example, if a faction takes control of Foxconn-like area, then can U.S. business, for its business interests, really be like, OK, I don't care if you lose, for example? I think Gordon has a question for you. (1:20:13)

Yeah. I don't think that in an ideal world we would be able to try to shape events in China, especially in a chaotic situation. But in the real world, I'm not sure that we have the ability to do that. And in a situation where we don't have information, you know, China right now is closing up. Xi Jinping has been shutting down the doors. (1:20:44)

But especially if the political situation, the political system is disintegrating, we'd have even less information. And so I'm afraid that whatever we would try to do would not be on the basis of knowing what the situation is, and we could make things worse, which is the reason why my approach is, let's try and protect our businesses. (1:21:07)

Let's try to protect American citizens in China. But let's not try to interfere in it until, you know, things calm down. Because then, and only then, will we have the ability to assess the situation and to make reasonable choices, which is the reason why I say, you know, in the first stage of this, we should try and stay out. (1:21:25)

And I know it's controversial, but the point is we should only try to do what we have the power to do. And in this situation, I don't think we have that ability. Okay, we have time for one question, and we will go to you. Thank you all the panelists for being here. My name is Tony. I'm an undergraduate at Wisconsin Madison. I have a specific question, not towards our allies, but towards our adversaries in the and North Korea. A weakened China or a collapsed CCP would most likely mean that these foreign adversaries of the United States would try to gain a foothold or influence into the Chinese society, no matter if it's culturally, socially, or economically. (1:22:09)

And what I want to know is, what could the United States do in an event like this to prevent foreign adversaries to gain a foothold to try to influence China? Thank you. (1:22:16)

Randy, I think that's for you. Oh, is it? That's a hard one. You know, if this happened today, we have a lot of different problems with Mr. Putin. We have no communications with Kim Jong-un. So being able to be, you know, very deft and nuanced in how we reposition those relationships so that they don't try to exercise undue influence in China or try to take advantage, it would be very, very difficult. (1:22:56)

You know, I think over time, I would be a little more optimistic about North Korea because the North Koreans don't like the Chinese. And, you know, the alliance notwithstanding, the lips and teeth alliance notwithstanding, it's not by choice, it's by necessity that they've developed this relationship with China. They don't have a lot of power, so in the event of a collapse of China, I'm not sure there's any sort of active role they'd play. (1:23:23)

But I would certainly be looking for opportunities to really kind of further separate them in the event a successor government in China is hostile to us. I think there are opportunities to drive a wedge in North Korea. With Russia, you know, all those wedges are there, all those historical legacies are there. It just, if it happened tomorrow, I wouldn't be very optimistic given our relationship with Mr. Putin, which even President Trump seems to be turning on at the moment. (1:23:50)

But we've sort of got these big fish to fry, and it would be difficult to have a constructive conversation. Down the road, maybe. You know, there's all these fantasies out there about playing the Russia card against China. I don't put a lot of stock in it, but down the road, if there's a collapse in China, maybe. You know, just one thing. (1:24:13)

The border between Korea and China has moved hundreds of miles in both directions over the course of more than half a millennia. And in the situation you talk about, you know, if the PLA is internally focused, you know, it's not inconceivable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decides it's time to take back some of that land. Because remember, on the Chinese side of that border, there are ethnic Koreans. And they're ethnic Koreans not because they moved to China, but it's because the border changed. (1:24:44)

And I'm sure that that's in the minds of people in Pyongyang, as well as Seoul. Okay, that's all the time we have for this panel. Thank you, Randy, Gordon, and Rick. So our next panel is being mic'd up, so we'll take a five-minute recess. All right, thank you. Justice and Constitutional Convention. So our first speaker will be Mr. Tazi, followed by Mr. Ni, and then following Mr. Ni will be Nina Hsieh, and then the last speaker is Don Clark. All right, so the podium is yours, Piero. All right. (1:25:27)

Well, thank you very much, Miles. And I'm going to be talking about dismantling the tools of repression, and that includes the surveillance state, the dossier system, social credit system, and the hukou system as well. So one thing, of course, I'll have to do is address what these are. (1:25:43)

But if there's a certain theme, I think, to my remarks, it's that past is prologue, both in terms of understanding what the present system is, but also what to expect. I think to begin with, it's very important to understand that this is a totalitarian system that's designed to perpetuate the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. And oftentimes we hear the use of the word authoritarianism to describe China, but I think there's an important distinction. (1:26:17)

And as we look at the mechanisms of the surveillance state, I think that distinction comes into focus. An authoritarian system is one where, if you oppose the government, you are beaten, jailed, repressed, but generally there's a space for business, for religious worship. A ready distinction might be, for the most part, Taiwan under the Kuomintang during the martial law period, where you did have other avenues, whereas a totalitarian system seeks to dominate the totality of society, and that's the context in which these instruments of repression... past being prologue. (1:27:11)

Let's talk about the hukou jerdu system first. That's household registration, and the present origins began in 1958 during the Maoist period, and it really would tie people to a place and that rural-urban distinction. It controlled internal migration, and that has... and it was really to the detriment and disadvantage of the vast majority of rural Chinese. That has changed, I mean, as certainly as China entered the reform era and it became the world's factory, you had mass migrations there, but people who don't have a hukou from a particular municipality are still at a disadvantage. (1:27:53)

And again, there has been reforms, especially if, you know, the golden ticket, to use a Willy Wonka term, is Beijing or Shanghai, you know, these cities. And if you do have a hukou that ties you to these great urban centers, you have educational opportunities, you have work opportunities that otherwise are denied to people. We're going to talk about ideological reliability, too, and how that fits in. (1:28:22)

But really, I think, again, past this prologue, the roots really go deeper to the hukou system. If you want to go back to the Western Zhou dynasty, 11th, 8th century, you start to see the roots there, certainly as you enter the Warring States period, where there was a need to, you know, for defensive reasons, communal defense, you had organization of households. But it really, I think, comes to the fore in the Qin dynasty. (1:28:54)

And there was a need to control population, mass mobilization for these corvée labor projects and conscription. The Qin state was a highly militarized state, and it was based on a philosophy called legalism, fa jia. And Chinese legalism is, it's a proto-totalitarian theory. If you read Han Feizi, the great legalist theoretician, or if you look at Shang Yang, the reformer, the idea of local surveillance, collective responsibility, and punishment, that really comes to the fore. (1:29:38)

And I think to understand the PRC today, in some ways, yes, it is Marxist, it is Leninist, it is Maoist, it is Shiist, but these are, in many ways, things that have been glommed onto this legalist strain, this legalist tradition there. I think that if you look at people like Wang Huning, who's a very important figure in the Chinese Communist Party, in part because he's a survivor, he advised Jiang Zeming, Hu Jintao, and now Xi Jinping. In some ways, you know, he is, you see him more as a legalist and someone who questions Marxism's compatibility with China. That is not to downplay the, or too much, at least, the role of Marxist, and especially Leninist, ideology. (1:30:39)

The Chinese Communist Party is a Leninist system, Leninist party. I think one more recent commentator, Stephen Kotkin, talks about that. He is interesting because he understands the Soviet Union. I don't know if people are familiar with his biography of Stalin's two of three volumes that have come out. (1:30:58)

I don't know if he fully understands China as much, but that lens by which to look at the Leninist one is very interesting. So we see this continuity from these kind of legalist ideas, collective responsibility, punishment, manageable clusters, population tracking. These, I think, are means of control that do have their roots in this legalist tradition. Mass mobilization, we talked about the Qin dynasty as needing to mobilize people to militarize them. (1:31:33)

Mao was very good with that mass line, the ideological mobilization towards a common goal. Today, though, Xi Jinping certainly doesn't have that charisma of Mao Zedong, and we don't see that ideological fervor. That is not something that's characteristic of the reform era, or now the Xi era, which I think is in many ways characterized by certain non-movements, such as the laying flat Tanping, or let it rot Bailan. Xi Jinping wants that great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, the China dream, and a lot of the response is met. (1:32:15)

So how do you control the masses in that scenario? And that's where technology, facial recognition, social credit system exists. There's a focus on what Pei Minxi calls ex-ante or preventive repression. His book, The Sentinel State Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China, is useful. There's this idea of fangkong, prevention and control, that you especially saw during the COVID period. Zhao Kezhi, the Minister of Public Security in 2019, said the prevention of political risk is the first priority. (1:32:58)

Now this system is... a way to think of it, I think, is multi-layered. It's both horizontal. It's vertical. It exists as a bureaucracy. It's not... but not one that's entirely centralized. It is diffused. You do have neighborhood monitors. You do have now a credit monitoring system. You do see certain things like... what is it? Jirma, the sesame, as an open sesame, too. (1:33:31)

That credit payment system that is integrated in some ways with this social credit score. You have political and legal affairs departments throughout the bureaucracy at different levels. You know, the number of uniformed police in China is relatively small. And even, you know, Rick Fisher, you talked about the Ministry of Public Security. I think you mentioned 1.2 million people there. (1:33:58)

If you look at East Germany and the Stasi there as a measure of comparison, which was, I think, 91,000, the equivalent in terms of population would be maybe 8 million in China. So it is relatively a smaller people, you know, police presence. And that is because it is diffused. Again, it's at the oftentimes the neighborhood level, the reliance on informers, and it is also, I think, the reliance on technology. (1:34:30)

Two very important technology systems. One is Skynet Tianwang. That is the Ministry of Public Security. Again, police can tap into it. It's more urban-focused. And then the other is sharp eyes or bright snow, Xueliang Gongzheng. And that also incorporates things such as facial recognition, even gate recognition, how you walk. And that's more focused on the countryside. (1:35:06)

There's an exportation of this to other countries, authoritarian countries, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and it's often under the guise of the smart city or safe city programs. (1:35:15)

So that is another challenge. You have the monitoring of WeChat and also what's posted on the internet. The Chinese are very adept at trying to get around that. You know, people might be familiar with Winnie the Pooh references, so you got to clap down at that. It's a little bit like guacamole there, too, because the Me Too movement, that was censored. (1:35:40)

So people would start to... me, like uncooked rice, and then like a rabbit, you know, tuza, you know, there. And that would be... and then the authorities are trying to catch on and try to censor these things. The social governance objectives, you have, I think, a lot of that came into its own during COVID and the COVID outbreak there that was, you know, really, I think, put on stilts in terms of controlling the population. The dossier system, this is something that is very ideological. (1:36:16)

Your background, your family background, your political background is all kept track of. And this, there's a kind of a whiff of Maoism here, the idea of the class background. Are you red? Are you black? Red is good. Black is bad. If you came from a landowner family or whatever, this... and it even goes back to the imperial period, that multi-generation idea of punishment as well. (1:36:40)

One interesting aside, people may have seen that it was, I think, during the COVID period, there was a video that went viral. A police officer was beating a protester and says, you're going to be punished for three generations. And the response was three generations, we are the last generation. And that goes to that idea of kind of laying flat in Tanping. How do you motivate a people who are opting out? And that goes to sort of, I think, the idea of society and kind of its brittleness there. (1:37:20)

But this idea of also, we see this idea of collective punishment. You know, one thing very interesting about your social credit score, if you are connected with kind of people that have bad social credit, your social credit goes down. So you see a lot of defriending there too, and you can become sort of an outcast that way and lose friends. What does that do to social trust, to social bonds? Again, I think a lot of these ideas, particularly collective punishment, it is this legalist idea. (1:37:56)

Legalism, not just punishments, but also rewards. Hanfeizi, the ruler who uses law must rely on punishment for those who violate it and reward those who follow it. This, of course, has led to this mindset, has led to a lot of social tensions we see right now, again, post-COVID, especially with the economy. We see these bicyclists in Henan, we see in Shandong veterans protesting there. (1:38:22)

And there's this, you know, this concern over the economy. So this idea of stability is being stressed. So that brings us to that what-if scenario after the fall of the CCP. You know, we oftentimes think in Western terms, transitional justice. You know, you look at Cambodia in 1993, how these kind of the Western human rights legal industrial complex, you know, stood to make a lot of money and whatnot there. (1:38:58)

That's not going to happen in China. China is a great country. What I think you will see, though, is looking back on the resources in the Chinese tradition, if the Qin dynasty was legalist, and it was really the only legalist dynasty per se, the one that really adopted legalism, what followed the Qin? What followed the Qin in terms of dynasty? Anyone? Bueller? The Han. Thank you, Mr. Ni, who's not Chinese. But yes, the Han dynasty followed that. (1:39:40)

And the Han dynasty rejected legalism. The justification for regime change, the loss of the mandate of heaven was in Confucian Menchian terms. Liu Bang, the emperor, it was a rejection, overt rejection of legalism. Now, cynics will point out that legalism always was retained, even under Confucian regimes, that the idea of Confucian on the outside, but legalist on the inside, yes, and in many ways, Confucianism sort of served like Christianity did post-Constantine and post-Theodosius. It gave legitimacy to a regime, but they'd also still retain certain legalist elements. (1:40:33)

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（以下は "After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China | Hudson Institute" と題された講演動画の文字起こしです。長いので 4分割しています。 ）

Even the current regime often uses Confucian garb in which to clothe itself, for example, Confucius Institutes, or this silly television show when Marx met Confucius, but it is not a Confucian one. And Confucianism did ameliorate the situation in China, in post-Qin. The Han restoration, it did ameliorate some of the worst aspects of legalism. Punishment was loosened. The idea of collective punishment was loosened. (1:41:13)

And I think also you saw the rise of localism as opposed to that legalist-Qin centralization. The emphasis on moral education, in many ways, the Confucian ideal is lawlessness. Not lawlessness in the sense of anarchy, but the idea of virtue. If you have a virtuous society, if the emperor is virtuous, if society is virtuous, you don't need the laws. (1:41:33)

Tacitus remarked that a superabundance of law is a sure sign of a civilization in decay. And when you think about that, I think that's very much true. So I think, and just to kind of illustrate the difference between a Confucian mindset and a legalist mindset, both Han Feizi and Confucius tell the story of a man named Honest Kung. Honest Kung was so honest that he turned his father in for stealing a sheep. Now, if Han Feizi, the legalist, what does he say about Honest Kung? (1:42:06)

Good guy? Bad guy? He's a model citizen. He could be a model Maoist here. I mean, he was, you know, he turned in his own father. What does Confucius say about him? He's the worst kind of human being that there could be. To turn on your own father, you know, never go against the family, you know, that's a lesson from the godfather. (1:42:33)

But it is true in Confucian terms as well. So I think what we will see, if we do see a collapse there, one of the sort of the mechanisms that you will will see is more of a localization. And will you see the emergence of sort of a Confucian constitutionalism? You know, during the reform era, there was talk about that. Zhang Qing, not that Zhang Qing, a different Zhang Qing, wrote a book, Confucian Constitutionalism. There was that movement. (1:43:07)

I think Taiwan, in many ways, can be an example there. You know, the Republic of China Constitution, dating back to 1912 and then the 1947 reform, has a five-branch system. Two branches that are different from ours are the examination system and the control, or the examination yin, and the control yin. That, I think, the conscious idea was to hearken back to a Chinese constitutionalism that existed even during the imperial periods. (1:43:37)

The examination referred to the scholarly elites that were versed in the Confucian classics. The control yin, or the idea of control, was the idea of a bureaucracy that checked the excesses of the emperor. The idea of remonstrance that existed, that understanding of virtue, that law above the law that was appealed to even in the Chinese system. So I think you might see something that is more indigenous there, too. (1:44:16)

The ROC influence, right now, Lai Ching-de is giving 10 speeches on 10 topics. He's talking about human rights, he's talking about democracy, sovereignty. Yes, obviously directed at a local Taiwanese audience, but if you read the Global Times, they're really freaking out about it, too, because that message does seep through. You will, of course, have Western liberal ideas somewhat creeping in, but the Western ideas aren't necessarily going to be liberal. (1:44:51)

So, for example, two popular thinkers in China, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, critics of liberalism. It'll be interesting to see kind of what emerges. And then, I think also this idea of localism and that, you know, we think of China as a entity that is unified, but there is this idea of the opening line of the Three Kingdoms. The realm long divided must unite, long united must divide. (1:45:24)

You will probably see more in certain regions such as Guangdong, the Hong Kong influence, perhaps an emergence of more liberal regimes. You might see, you know, truth and reconciliation committees there. You will probably see then an uneven dismantling of all these systems. But again, I think the past is prologue. You will see the emergence of, yeah, a sort of modified form of Confucianism, a moving away from these instruments of totalitarian control, but it will be uneven depending on where you are. Thank you very much. (1:46:10)

Well, first of all, thanks for Hudson for having me and Miles and Colin in particular. And let me just say that I'm giving these remarks not in my NED capacity, just in my personal capacity. (1:46:37)

And that's partially because the more I thought about the topic of transnational justice, the more daunting it became. So I'm just kind of going to go over a few of the challenges and problems, and then also talk about a few of the advantages that China may have and how we can potentially build on some of those strengths. (1:46:58)

Obviously, there's a lot to pull on and look at in the international community and the experience. There have been truth commissions of some sort or another in Guatemala, Morocco, the Philippines, Chad, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Nepal, El Salvador, Ireland, and so on. And of course, also in the post-communist space, and particularly in the post-Soviet states, where it may be more, because of the Leninist system, more useful for China to draw on. (1:47:33)

But I think of an experience I had about 10 years ago. You know, I was with some Chinese human rights lawyers, and they were looking at cases of injustice. And we had an American who was talking about taking on cases of injustice and using DNA evidence to challenge these cases. And I thought it was a wonderful session after a whole day workshop, but these Chinese lawyers felt that this was inappropriate for the Chinese situation, and that their particular situation, their particular institutions, deserved its own model. And I think that that's partially the case. (1:48:00)

And so that's, to some extent, the case because of the challenges, including, number one, the very long history of the CCP. So we have some of the, you know, very well-known human rights abuses, atrocities that have taken place. Obviously, we think of things like the Great Leap Forward, 30 million deaths, at least, the Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen Massacre, the crimes against humanity that are still ongoing in the Uyghur region. (1:48:33)

These are some of the things we first think of. But then there are a whole series of lesser-known ones, the Yan'an Rectification Campaign, the Siege of Changchun, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, you know, which 500,000 to one to two million people died in the early 50s, the anti-rightist movements, the Tibetan uprising, the Cultural Revolution as it impacted people in southern Mongolia, the things like the July 5th, 2009 massacre in Urumqi, the suppression of Falun Gong and organ harvesting. And then there are crackdowns that are even non-violent in nature, such as the crackdowns on civil society, against the workers' rights movement, the 709 crackdown on lawyers, which took place about 10 years ago, July 9th, 2015. We're celebrating the 10th anniversary of that. And then if we look at Hong Kong, since 2020, with the national security law. (1:49:35)

So these are just a huge amount of disasters. And that doesn't even take into consideration issues of economic, social, and cultural rights violations, where we see lots of petitioners continuing going to Beijing to get some form of redress. So there's the question of where do we begin? There's also another challenge of there's a lack of a strong opposition right now. (1:50:08)

So in looking at the post-communist, you know, the transitions in post-communist states, some scholars have found that the scope and pace of reckoning were strongly linked to the relationship between the regime and the opposition during communism and in the post-communism phase. So after surveying many countries, scholars have came to the conclusion that in areas such as lustration, which is kind of vetting for regime participants, court proceedings, and access to secret files, scholars concluded that there was a clear pattern that the communists would vote against the reckoning while the opposition provided impetus for it. (1:50:47)

So in other words, where there's a strong opposition, there's the strong impetus for a reckoning. And by contrast, where organized opposition towards communism was weak because of a combination of pre-communist experience with political pluralism or because of severe repression of any nascent counter-elite, one finds a much weaker push towards transnational justice. (1:51:19)

So that's another issue that China faces. I would say right now, at least in terms of China domestically, there is no real organized opposition. There's no figure like Navalny, for example. And at least in most people's lived memory, there's not a lot of experience with political pluralism. Another problem one could foresee potentially is that there's a history in which each dynasty, as it takes over, will paint the previous dynasty in a negative light. (1:51:54)

And one can imagine a scenario in which if the CCP were to fall, there would be a very superficial reckoning with the past or a very perfunctory reckoning. And there's also a risk, I believe, of a focus on retributive justice without having a social transformation to really change society towards a more democratic society. (1:52:25)

As Piero was saying, if you say a totalitarian or all-encompassing controlling regime, we need to have some sort of similar mechanism to get towards a more democratic society. So those are some of the challenges, and I'm sure there are many, many more that I have not even thought of. But some of the advantages I could see that we could build on are there's a deep respect for history in Chinese culture, obviously, almost like a religious-like devotion to the importance of history. (1:52:58)

And this is one reason why President Xi Jinping has been on guard is what it brands historical nihilism and any looking into the inquiry of the party and attempts to overthrow the Communist Party. But could we use that emphasis on history to do something like Chile did, where there were committees, high-level committees, to assess the human rights violations? We could also, similarly, in addition to having a high-level committee, perhaps have other commissions at a local level to address the issues of the size of China, but also the political differences in repression that took place. (1:53:42)

So the repression that takes place in Henan or Shandong is very different than places like the Tibet Autonomous Region or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. So there may be a need for having different historical or different regional commissions. Another advantage that there is, actually, is civil society has made excellent efforts over time at human rights documentation. So some of these to think about are the Uyghur Tribunal, which convened a series of experts to look at the issues of crimes against humanity and genocide in the Uyghur region that pulled evidence from many reputable sources. (1:54:28)

There's things like the Xinjiang Victims Database that has thousands and thousands of victims and the detailed testimonies, and the Uyghur Transitional Justice Database. There was the China Tribunal on forced organ harvesting. Organizations like Human Rights in China have documented in great detail the stories of the and fathers whose sons and daughters were victims of the Tiananmen Massacre. The CHRD, the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders, has a database on prisoners of conscience. There are groups to dialogue with, such as the Tiananmen Mothers, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, which used to put on the vigil every year in Hong Kong for Tiananmen Square. And civil society has also been very adept at using the UN system. (1:55:34)

Now, why would that matter? Some may be skeptical of the UN, but these are human rights treaties that the Chinese government itself has ratified and agreed to And since 2018 alone, there have been 126 letters and communications from UN special procedures, that's special rapporteurs who are experts or their working groups. So these have involved the gathering of evidence, asking the Chinese government for their response, and the finding of documentation. (1:56:09)

So this is a very powerful tool in terms of documentation. And civil society is also very useful in forming alliances. There are many informal gatherings and dialogues between Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, mainlanders. And so there's some degree of solidarity and work that can be drawn on there. And I would also say that China has a great tradition of civil society historians. (1:56:41)

If one looks at Ian Johnson's recent book, we can see that there's many people who have made it their mission to document things on kind of the local level. (1:56:48)

And Hong Kong, of course, used to have a very vibrant publishing industry in which people like Zhao Ziyang would even write his autobiography to get his point of view of how things occurred in very important moments in Chinese history. And finally, I will say that we can make use of China's religious communities. And maybe this isn't something that people would normally think of, but they have a deep commitment to their communities. (1:57:19)

And in many cases, an emphasis on restorative justice. If one thinks of even like Pastor Wang Yi, who is talking about repenting and caring for the souls of the people who are persecuting him. Well, could these religious communities be something to potentially engage in dialogue with in a post-communist society? Perhaps we could draw on that. (1:57:48)

Obviously, the Dalai Lama, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, has set forth a path of dialogue. Furthermore, there are intellectuals such as Ilham Thothi, who had spent their whole lives, their careers, trying to build dialogue and understanding. He's in prison, but hopefully someone like that could also be used in a post-communist society to bring about transitional justice. And I think a final takeaway is, you know, I really appreciated some of the first session talks to hear about some of the disaster scenario planning and the contingencies there. (1:58:27)

But maybe there's even the possibility of another scenario where we talk about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, you know, Xi Jinping's main tagline that he's always promoting. But can this only be done through fear, through the coercive measures of the security state and power projection? Or, as Piero was perhaps saying, could they eventually, could Chinese people want to say that we want greatness, but based on morality and virtue? And could someone try to eventually lead the country towards something that can actually, they can be proud of their cultural heritage. (1:59:19)

So currently, it's not really, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, it's not compatible with denying freedom of religion, having Uyghurs in concentration camps or in prisons where we have no idea if they even had a lawyer of their choice, and for controlling the internet. This is not a way towards greatness. So true greatness will require this kind of transition. (1:59:46)

And so I hope that some of these ideas, having a historical commission and to look at the truth, and then also having provincial and local bodies to engage in dialogue with civil society, with religious leaders, and with the common people, could be some of the paths towards a new future. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Miles. So when the Chinese communist rule collapse, the United States will need to lead an effort to head off ethnic violence and political retribution and civil war. (2:00:34)

To put society, to put the Chinese society on a stable footing for the future, the U.S. policies will be critical to advance independence, democracy, freedom of speech and religion, and other fundamental human rights. And this is the, this priority is going to be my focus. It serves American interests by encouraging an orderly transition toward a stable China, at peace with its own people, including its minorities and its neighbors. (2:01:10)

And I will be drawing upon, or I have drawn upon various historical precedents, including the sudden collapse of Soviet communism that ended the Cold War without a shot fired. Its first stages saw the liberation of millions of captive people who formed 20 new republics in Central and Eastern Europe, which have largely gravitated to the West in what historians consider to be a mostly peaceful transition. (2:01:38)

And that is our goal for China. In China, the undertaking will require varied policies calibrated to the needs of each region, locale, and demographic of that diverse country. I will discuss three broad categories of challenges the U.S. needs to prepare for. First, determining the future political status of the special administrative region of Hong Kong and the five autonomous regions of Guangxi, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. By law, the CCP allows these regions the degree of self-governance and ability to legislate, but which in practice, of course, is curtailed. (2:02:18)

Together, these regions represent some 118 million people and include the homelands of China's most oppressed and thus aggrieved ethnic minorities. The regions will each face the decision of whether to remain in China with reinforced autonomy or to separate and declare itself an independent sovereign state. (2:02:38)

Some may also consider unifying with neighboring states. The U.S., working with its Indo-Pacific allies, should be prepared to support and advise them. Our support for independence should depend on the will of the people of the province, various regional factors, and conditions that U.S. policymakers define in a set of guidelines reflecting U.S. government interests. And first, the first step, the United States government should adopt a set of principles or guidelines to form and form an interagency task force to coordinate this effort. (2:03:16)

Principles that the President George H.W. Bush administration adopted on the eve of the Soviet Union's dissolution provides a solid basis. If followed, the new republics could expect U.S. cooperation and assistance. These five guiding principles were, first, self-determination, consistent with democratic principles, recognition of existing borders, support for democracy and rule of law, preservation of human rights and the rights of national minorities, and finally, respect for international law and obligations. (2:03:55)

The U.S. should take the lead in weighing whether secession is a viable option for each autonomous region on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with regional leaders and neighboring powers. In some cases, Washington may determine that secession is unrealistic. For example, an unresolved border dispute exists with a neighboring country, in which case the U.S. should make clear its opposition. (2:04:21)

These states will go ahead anyhow, as we've seen in the past, but they will not get U.S. assistance. Critically, the U.S. quickly recognized the newly declared states of Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 and exchanged diplomats with them. By mid-1990, democratically elected governments had replaced all of the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe. In Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, newly created center-right parties formed these governments. (2:04:54)

It is noteworthy that some of the new democratically elected leaders, such as in Bulgaria and Romania, were reformed, that's a key word there, were reformed communists who emerged from the communist party, and the U.S. did not hesitate to recognize them as legitimate as well. Due to the fast-moving events at the end of the Cold War, democratic voting to choose leaders of the new government sometimes came months after the United States showed political support for the new de facto leaders. (2:05:23)

For example, with the large peaceful protest movements called the Velvet Revolution gaining momentum in Prague through November 1989, Czechoslovakia's communist government resigned in December, and the longtime communist president, before resigning himself, appointed political dissident Václav Havel as the new president to replace him, which the communist party-dominated rubber-stamp parliament unanimously approved. President Havel came to Washington for an working visit three months later, and he was invited to then address a joint meeting of Congress. It was not until June 1990, six months after the former president appointed him, that Czech citizens finally voted Havel into the presidency through free democratic elections that established a new parliament. (2:06:20)

Another possible scenario is that one or more Chinese provinces may seek to merge with a neighboring country. And I'm thinking of Inner Mongolia with the Republic of Mongolia, for example, or Hong Kong and Guangdong, or Fujian with Taiwan. The United States should give this careful consideration should arise, keeping in mind the unique circumstances that allowed the reunification of East and West Germany. In November 1989, the U.S. acted quickly in investing heavily in areas of diplomacy, trade, and defense to support West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who unexpectedly announced in November 1989 a program for free elections in East Germany and a path for reunification with West Germany. So to sum this up, one, the U.S. should be prepared with guidelines for independence, which must be widely disseminated, similar to the ones used at the Soviet breakup. (2:07:21)

U.S. support is conditioned on acceptance of these guidelines by the newly emerging states. Two, the U.S. should make a preliminary determination whether independence would serve American interests before pledging our support. Three, the U.S. should expect that all five of China's autonomous regions and Hong Kong to choose independence. A Han majority in a minority area or strong CCP control in a particular region does not preclude a vote for independence, as we saw in the Soviet empire breakup. (2:07:59)

A skilled U.S. diplomacy will be needed to renegotiate more robust autonomy guarantees for any autonomous region that remains in China. The U.S., together with its allies, should be prepared to provide expert advice, logistical help, and validation of the outcome in free and fair referendums. The U.S. should quickly recognize the new sovereign states and establish diplomatic relations with them. (2:08:23)

It should help them gain acceptance from what remains of China and from the world. It should facilitate any mergers involving new states and in resolving border disputes, especially those concerning the China-India border. The U.S. should recognize as legitimate those voted to leadership posts in China and the newly independent countries in free and fair elections and referendums, including reformed former CCP members. (2:08:58)

Invite heads of state and parliamentary leaders for official visits to Washington within months of their taking office to empower them and their democratic system, strengthen their country's sovereignty, and facilitate bilateral relations. And finally, to further solidify the sovereignty of the new republics, the U.S. should support their entry as member states into the UN, ASEAN, and other key regional and international organizations. (2:09:20)

And they should also be brought into regional defense alliances. So let's go through some of these autonomous regions and into special region. So with its demonstrable passion for democratic freedom, Hong Kong will undoubtedly be at the forefront of those seeking independence from China as soon as the opportunity arises. And with its recent democratic experience, high degree of human development, and vibrant economy, it's the most likely to succeed. (2:09:49)

Hong Kong has a pro-national, a proto-national constitution in its basic law, recent experience with the multi-party system, and a legislative and judicial infrastructure that can be reinvigorated with free and fair democratic elections, which should include those in the diaspora. The U.S. should give Hong Kong the political, legal, and diplomatic support to make the transition to independence consistent with U.S. guidelines. (2:10:20)

Then there's the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which will undoubtedly seek independence from China at the first opportunity as well, as no bonds of trust with Beijing can exist, given the genocide it has suffered under CCP rule. Several well-organized Uyghur diaspora organizations advocate for a peaceful democratic transition. They express pride in the Turkic ethnic group's long history on the steppe of Central Asia, their millennial-old culture, and their Muslim religion. (2:10:50)

The U.S. should support Xinjiang in the determination of its future status. While Xinjiang would have numerous reasons for optimism as a free nation, it will have to overcome formidable challenges, including resentment against its large Han minority, some of whom were sent there just to oppress them, and the influence of Islamist extremism across its borders. The diaspora organizations from Xinjiang in the United States and other Western nations will be a valuable resource for democratic nation-building. It will need strong U.S. support. Tibet is the home to the ethnic Tibetan Buddhist community. (2:11:31)

Ethnic Tibetan communities are also found to live in various Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in other Chinese provinces. Small, relatively poor, and severely oppressed, Tibet will be facing two choices with the collapse of the CCP regime, in my view. One is to pursue independent sovereignty or to remain in China with strength and greater autonomy. Most of Tibet's population of about 3.6 million people no longer speak Tibetan, and many of them are Han Chinese transplanted there under the CCP's forced assimilation policy. (2:12:11)

Authorities have removed at least one million Tibetan children from their families and placed them in state-run boarding schools to indoctrinate them against their Tibetan identity. Beijing is now asserting the right to validate the reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama in the category of Nepalese, believe it or not. The Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism in exile in India, has been an important voice of peace, stability, and democracy for Tibetans, and his role will be critical to the success of the region as it goes forward. (2:12:47)

He publicly declares that he rejects independence for Tibet and instead seeks meaningful autonomy, espousing a middle way policy. Whether he or his successor will continue to hold this view in the absence of this of the CCP pressure remains to be seen. The entire population of Tibet, including the exile community, should have the opportunity to vote democratically to determine independence. (2:13:13)

As the Dalai Lama's website declares, he established democratic governance for the Tibetan government in exile. (2:13:19)

Another important consideration is Tibet's borders. U.S. diplomats will need to help resolve whether and how to include the autonomous Tibetan prefectures and counties within the country and to deal with the border conflict with India. If there is no resolution to the border dispute, the U.S. should consider measures to reinforce Tibet's autonomy. The Tibetan policy and support act, which President Trump signed into law in 2020, lays some groundwork for this and can be built upon. (2:13:58)

It establishes an official U.S. policy of the right of the Tibetan Buddhist community to select and venerate its own religious leaders and specifies sanctions for Chinese officials who interfere in the selection of his successor. In addition, the act requires a U.S. consulate in Lhasa and it should quickly appoint a consul in that eventuality. Inner Mongolia and Ningxia Wei province both have grievances based on forced cultural assimilation policies of Beijing and I would expect them to vote for independence as well. (2:14:37)

They and Guangxi should be supported if they do. Then there's the matter of egregious human rights violations. A few, and these are only a few examples of immediate action steps that the U.S. should ensure if the U.S. moves in there, follow. One, free all political and religious detainees, including the nine Catholic bishops currently in secret detention, and the prisoners, all prisoners, including those held in unofficial detention places, forced labor camps and psychiatric institutes, including Xinjiang's large re-education camp complex, and the 2,000 political prisoners in Hong Kong, including Jimmy Lai. Two, stop forced sterilizations. (2:15:32)

These are steps that can be taken immediately. Stop forced sterilizations and forced abortions in Xinjiang and elsewhere where it occurs. In both Xinjiang and Tibet, release the combined estimate of 2 million children forced into state boarding schools and reunite them with their families. In all hospitals and transplant centers, suspend organ transplant surgeries until organ donations are determined to be voluntary. (2:16:00)

Reopen houses of worship that have been shut or repurposed. Allow houses of worship and religious organizations to operate independently from patriotic associations and similar state and party organizations. End CCP indoctrination, re-education, and ensure free speech and the free flow of information, including in minority languages. Reform textbooks, which, for example, teach Xi Jinping's saying such as, quote, our struggle with the West is irreconcilable, and so we'll be even very sharp. (2:16:37)

They've got to go. So, that concludes. There's a Chinese proverb that a crisis is an opportunity riding a dangerous wind, and the U.S. effort to advance freedom and justice can help make this a beneficial opportunity for all concerned. Thank you very much. So, thank you. My thanks to the Hudson Institute and to Miles for asking me. I'm a little embarrassed to be speaking here today because my subject of expertise, which is the domestic PRC legal system, the premise of this talk, of course, is that that subject has disappeared. (2:17:40)

So, I'm going to be talking a little bit about constitution making. Back in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wondered whether societies, he said, are really capable of establishing a good government from reflection or choice or whether they are forced, whether they are destined, forever destined, to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. (2:18:20)

So, today I want to say something about what, you know, we might expect from a constitution making process following a collapse of the current political system in China. So, a few caveats are in order here. First of all, what do we mean by collapse? Well, it could mean a range of things. You know, we say that the Soviet Union collapsed, but what really happened there, of course, is that the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union collapsed. (2:18:48)

The constituent republics remained in existence, and in fact, they got even a more realistic existence than they had ever had under the Soviet Union. So, there was a structure on which to build the new Russia, even though we might be a little disappointed at how it turned out. Similarly, back in China, the Qing Dynasty collapsed, but the provinces retained their identity and their ability to act politically. (2:19:13)

Now, of course, modern China is not the USSR, and it's not the Qing Dynasty. In particular, it has systematically suppressed all the non-governmental organizations, whether it's independent churches, labor unions, chambers of commerce, organizations like that, that might have provided resources for post-collapse political organizations. Still, it seems unlikely that the loss of authority of the party center will result in utter anarchy. (2:19:47)

So, some sources of authority are going to arise, even if we don't know exactly what they're going to look like. Second, you know, we can observe developments, but I think it's very unlikely that outsiders can actually offer, you know, practical and useful advice. You know, there's not much that outsiders can know that the insiders, you know, don't already know. So, what exactly are we going to be telling them? You know, what really determines the content of constitutions is really intensely local political considerations, you know, on the ground when the constitution is being drafted. (2:20:32)

And so, you know, outsider's recommendations about what you ought to include and what your constitution-making process ought to look like, I think are largely pointless. So, what we can do, though, is refrain from giving bad advice, and in particular from, you know, when we're trying to assess it, from condemning whatever results simply because, you know, the constitution doesn't contain our particular, you know, pet provisions. (2:20:57)

So, you know, a constitution that looks terrific is very likely to be one that everyone ignores. And so, you know, it really is going to have to contain political compromises. Those political compromises, you know, probably are not going to look very good if we know what was behind them. So, at the same time, though, there are elements of constitution-making that we can identify as more or less likely to cause problems, you know, subject always to the caveat that every country is different and that there aren't any one-size-fits-all solutions. (2:21:34)

So, let's just start with why do you want a constitution anyways? Why might we expect the people of China to even bother with a new constitution following collapse? Well, you know, it does seem to be something that people generally do in the wake of political upheavals, and constitutions do, in fact, serve several useful purposes. (2:21:57)

One, you know, not required for international recognition, but it helps if you can have a constitution to sort of identify yourself as a real political entity. It also does serve a purpose, you know, if well done, in securing domestic recognition from various parties within one's own state. You know, it lays out the formal mechanisms for the exercise of public power, and in particular, I think it can memorialize, you know, in writing the details, you know, of a real political bargain that was struck among influential actors. (2:22:36)

So, it does seem pretty likely that people in China, you know, will want to establish a new constitution. You know, if we look at the history of constitution making in China, and this is something that Piero is much more familiar with than me, you know, we can make a few observations. And in general, this history is one of constitutions that were mostly ignored. (2:22:59)

So, you know, there's plenty of blame to go around here, but I think one factor is that the various actual and proposed constitutions were typically not the subject of some kind of real bargain among politically powerful actors. On the one hand, it might have been a constitution that was simply imposed unilaterally or pretty unilaterally by one actor that controlled everything throughout the process and didn't let anyone else have a say. (2:23:30)

On the other end, it might be a constitution that was largely, you know, drafted by people who didn't have any political power, and so they were incapable of making their provisions stick. (2:23:44)

And this is really a general dilemma of constitution making. So at any given time, in any given society, there's going to be people who are powerful and people who are not. Obviously, a simple piece of paper isn't going to change that. Now, a constitution that takes no account of this power is useless because it's never going to be effective. (2:24:06)

But at the same time, a constitution that takes full account of existing power relations is also useless because it's unnecessary. You know, it doesn't change anything. So, you know, we're going to need to understand that in assessing any constitution making process and its results, and again, not dismiss a constitution simply because it doesn't contain our favorite pet positions. Now, how do you get a constitution making process started? Well, a lot depends on the extent to which the existing institutions survive, you know, in a post-collapse China. So will the National People's Congress still exist as an institution? Well, what about the, you know, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference? Can they be used as a temporary source, at least of authority, for a new constitution? So, you know, whatever we may think about them now, again, we have the model of the Soviet Republic, which really, you know, didn't have much of a meaningful existence under the Soviet Union, and yet this kind of, you know, sham existence then all of a sudden, you know, became real when the Soviet Union collapsed. (2:25:14)

And the same for kind of the constitutions of the countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. You know, nobody paid any attention to them while they were under Soviet domination, but then they sort of sprang to life from the dead after the Soviet Union withdrew its support from the existing regimes. (2:25:38)

And so the Eastern European experience, I think, is on the one hand both instructive and not instructive. Except in Romania, you know, there was considerable institutional continuity in the post-communist transition. So typically, this transition took place in two phases, at least in terms of the constitutional order. So first, you know, we had these roundtable talks under the existing political and constitutional structure between the government and the opposition. (2:26:09)

And the governments in these cases basically knew that they were on the way out. They did have some bargaining power, but the talks were basically about smoothing their exit. And so the way for the path to free elections was typically paved using the existing constitutional structure and then ratified by, you know, the existing communist party-controlled legislature. (2:26:35)

And then in the second phase, then, these new governments oversaw further constitutional reforms. And you saw a similar kind of process in South Africa. So could this happen in China? I think it's unlikely that it would happen in the same way. You know, the governments of Eastern Europe depended on external military backing from the USSR. And when that disappeared, you know, they quickly folded. (2:26:59)

And, you know, we don't have a parallel situation to that in China. So we're unlikely to see this kind of bargaining, I think, you know, between a government and its opposition that we saw, for example, in Poland and Czechoslovakia. So institutionally speaking, the question is whether constitutional reform is going to be carried out within the framework of existing institutions or kind of in an institutional vacuum. (2:27:24)

Now, the last time China saw a complete collapse of central government authority was, I would put it in 1911 when the Qing dynasty fell. I don't count 1949 as a collapse because, you know, the KMT left, but the CCP came right in. And so we didn't see a, you know, a complete collapse of central authority. But at the time when the Qing dynasty fell, there was a robust civil society. (2:27:50)

So, you know, the Qing itself had this history of ruling with a light hand and depending a lot on local elites. And these local elites played a large role in late Qing reforms, and they were a resource that could be drawn on in constitution making. But as we know, those conditions don't exist in China today. (2:28:15)

The CCP, nobody would say that they rule with a light hand. And they have, of course, suppressed all kinds of independent civil society organizations. So it's hard to see civil society organizations such as Solidarity or the Catholic Church in the case of Poland playing much of a role as a substitute for collapsed political institutions if those institutions do indeed collapse. Now, whatever happens, the question of legitimacy is key. (2:28:40)

And we can break this down into a few components. We can call that upstream legitimacy, process legitimacy, and downstream legitimacy. So by upstream legitimacy, I mean, you know, how do we assemble a group to draft a new constitution? You know, what is our constitutional assembly? Let's call it a constituent assembly. You know, what is that going to look like? How will it be assembled? And according to what principles? Now, given our premise of collapse, that's the premise of this whole, you know, session today, it may be that there is no body, you know, with the political authority to make these kinds of decisions, you know, unchallenged. (2:29:26)

So it seems likely here that the parties to any bargain, again, if we are assuming as a premise kind of the collapse of central authority, it seems that the parties to any bargain about a constitutional assembly, you know, are going to be regional authorities. Whether, you know, whoever is in control of the various provinces, unless we really mean by collapse something like, you know, utter chaos and anarchy, which again, I don't think is likely to happen. (2:29:54)

But if we're looking to regional authorities, then I think it's going to be asking too much but, you know, to expect a lot of kind of legitimacy here. The provincial authority may be the local party boss. So I think some recognition of political reality is going to be necessary here. (2:30:19)

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（以下は "After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China | Hudson Institute" と題された講演動画の文字起こしです。長いので 4分割しています。 ）

But a constitution can still gain legitimacy in other ways. So the second kind of legitimacy would be process legitimacy. So here we're going to ask, how is this drafting process going to work? Is it going to take place under the shadows, you know, of a gun? (2:30:29)

Is it going to take place under the shadows of, you know, mass, you know, demonstrations? And so in this case, for example, if we were giving advice that someone was willing to listen to, we might say, let's not have it located in the capital city. Let's not have it located in any major city at all. (2:30:52)

Let's have it, you know, out in the boondocks somewhere so that nobody will be able to mobilize mass demonstrations to try to intimidate the delegates. You know, is voting going to be by some method that, you know, weighs population? Or is, again, if it's, if the constituent assembly is put together by regional authorities, are people going to insist that every region get a vote, kind of, you know, like our Senate works? Or is it going to work like, you know, our House of Representatives works? That's another question that constitutional assemblies have to deal with. (2:31:26)

And then how much public involvement is the right amount? You know, the U.S. Constitution, you know, was drafted by a small group in secret. Is that going to work in the 20th century, perhaps? Sorry, the 21st century? Perhaps not. But, you know, there's a lot of problems with an open and transparent process. In particular, you know, what makes it hard to make the kinds of sometimes dirty and messy, at least political compromises, that are necessary to make a constitution successful. (2:31:59)

You know, and a reliable, a realistic and effective new constitution for China is going to involve, you know, some kind of messy and ugly political deals. And so, again, I think it would be a mistake to demand too much by way of transparency if, as outsiders, we're trying to assess and, you know, evaluate the process. And then finally, we get downstream legitimacy. (2:32:26)

So this is about ratification. So, you know, even if voters are given, you know, for example, who's going to be the ratifying body? Is it going to be, you know, every citizen of China? What are the borders of China in that case? So there are questions that need to be answered here. But, you know, and so how they are answered is going to affect the legitimacy, the perceived legitimacy, of the ratification process. (2:32:52)

And, you know, it basically involves just giving voters a take-it-or-leave-it choice. But that is not, you know, that's not meaningless. You know, in 2000, in the year 2000, the voters in Zimbabwe rejected by a 54 to 46 percent vote a constitution that had been drafted in a process that looked consultative but, as we might expect, had been in fact controlled by Robert Mugabe. And then finally, how are we going to judge the result? Well, you know, I mentioned earlier it's unlikely that outsiders can have a significant impact on the process for making the constitution or for its substance. (2:33:34)

You know, with the possible exception of some very technical drafting tips, you know, how to resolve perhaps some logical contradictions in the document. But again, we can't go too far there because some of the logical contradictions may be the product of this political deal and everybody decided, let's live with the contradiction and we'll just, you know, kick that can down the road and let a constitutional court work it out, you know, for example, 20 years later. (2:34:02)

But, you know, outsiders will be called upon to pass judgment on the new constitution, possibly in the context of requests for, you know, military, financial, diplomatic, or just moral support. So I think the key here, you know, is to be realistic and not to expect too much. So the legal scholar Mark Tushnet, who is an expert on constitution making, has written, you know, whether a constitutional provision has life on the ground depends not on what the constitution's text guarantees, but rather, you know, on whether the political forces in the society are arrayed in a way that gives politically significant figures an interest in ensuring that the rights, you know, in this constitution are respected. (2:34:47)

And I think that's very wise. So any constitution that's going to last is going to have to deal with political realities. And I think the locals will know those political realities better than outsiders will. Thanks. I'll stop there. (2:35:02)

Okay, now we'll have a panel discussion, and I'm told that we can go beyond the original scheduled 12 o'clock mark. Okay, great. Okay, panelists, please. All right, thank you for these excellent presentations, and as expected, they were really brilliant. Let me just go by the order of the presentations. My first question goes to Piero. You mentioned about the past-days product, definitely, and, you know, there are a lot of similarities of the legalistic tradition and the communist nationalist regime. (2:36:11)

One of the things that's really striking me, that's really amazing, is the concept of hierarchy. You know, the traditional society, Chinese society, is all run by all kinds of... everybody should know his or her place. Hierarchy is the social fabricate, the core of the Chinese society. China is obsessed with harmony, stability. And in today's China, of course, the communism, even though it professes to be a champion for equality, but China is fundamentally very hierarchical. (2:36:40)

You know, you mentioned about, you know, you mentioned about the hukou, the house of registration. Now, what to know about hukou? Hukou is hereditary. It's very fengjian, it's very feudal. So, and of course, if you are living in Chinese society, you are, you should be really aware, and you're meant to be aware where you are, which level you are, what jibie you are, right? Which jibie you belong to, which level you belong to, which hierarchy you are, determines a lot of things, right? So in this case, how do we then instill the idea of equality? I mean, you know, the fundamental funding creed of this nation is that all men are created equal. (2:37:28)

So that actually is a very powerful, very powerful signal to the Chinese citizens. I remember there's one very important scene in 1990s when President Clinton, Bill Clinton, went to China, and he and his young daughter, Chelsea, walk on the street of Shanghai in the motorcade, and they finally, Chelsea wanted to have ice cream, Chinese ice cream. (2:37:51)

So they walk out of the limousine, and Bill Clinton, the President of the United States, held hands with his daughter and went to the ice cream shop and bought ice cream. Bill Clinton pulled out the wallet and paid for it. That, to the ordinary Chinese citizen, is unimaginable. It was at that moment that the idea of equality is worth probably several hours of speech. (2:38:15)

So it's very, very powerful. So how would you recommend? Well, I think, yes, hierarchy is very strong, and it does exist in not just the legalist tradition, in the Confucian tradition, but I think in that Confucian tradition, there is also an ameliorating and a more equal tradition. So, for example, the notion of the examination system and merit. (2:38:48)

In theory, anyone from the lowest social strata could take the examination and rise to the highest level. I think there is, in mentioned Confucianism, the Mencius in particular, there is a much more egalitarian strain. You know, Mencius' hierarchy of who comes first, it's the people come first. Then the grains and altars, the functions of governance of the state, and last comes the emperor. (2:39:16)

So even though there is this strong hierarchical tradition, there is a tension there, and there's an indigenous tension. (2:39:24)

I think you'll also then do have the example of Taiwan, and how does a Chinese... now, Taiwanese will say, well, we have a separate Taiwanese identity, but it still is very much a Chinese culture. And I think that notion and Chinese republicanism and Sun Yat-sen, there is that tradition as well. So I think there is a influence, partially that comes from Taiwan. There is an indigenous tradition that can be drawn upon. (2:40:07)

And then there's outside influence too, and you do have western influence as well. For example, feminism and some of the feminist movements too, that also, I think, you see that as well, some of these notions. So I think there's enough influences both from within, from the near without, and then from beyond to kind of, I think, shape a more egalitarian consciousness. One thing though I would, I think, caution, and it's very easy to think of sort of China as a whole, and the assumption that it will continue as a whole, but I do think that this, the centrifugal forces also are very strong. (2:41:03)

And what may be true in Guangdong, where you might see a more liberal strain emerge post-collapse, might not be true in Beijing or Tianjin. So I think that's, it's not going to be a one-size-fits-all answer. Yeah. You know, talk about the imperial examination. That was definitely a very good tradition, right? Equalizes this unbearable burden of hierarchy, because everybody is, in theory, supposed to have a chance to make it. (2:41:39)

Today in China, you know, Gaokao follows that tradition. Gaokao is basically China's examination of hell. So I personally went through that myself. But even that, even that, even that mechanism actually could, which has indeed served as some kind of safety, social safety valve for China, even that has some kind of, it's corrupted, degenerated. You have this, you know, recruits, college recruits, you through, basically through examination, Gaokao, and also you have a recommendation. And it is in that category, and also regional differences over there. (2:42:09)

Though the, the thresholds for being admitted into colleges are vastly different, different regions. Right. Beijing, Tianjin, and then Ningxia, Xinjiang, and they're very different. So there's a lot of inequalities over there too. But I get your point over there. Now, several of you mentioned about the issue of regional, regionalism. William, I mean, in your case, you also talk about regionalism. You know, you know, when you greet somebody in China, the first thing is, which province are you from? So that obviously is, has been sort of mitigated by the sort of centralization of several decades in China. But it is a very big tradition, right? It's still there. (2:42:55)

I mean, right now you have an independent movement. We know about the independence movement from Xinjiang, from Tibet. I mean, New York City, there is a Shanghai independent party, right? There is also the emergence of the Manchurian independence movement going on. They're actually beginning to print, you know, Manchurian citizenship cards to people. That's very interesting. (2:43:15)

So, in the year 1900, that's the year of the Boxer Rebellion, when the Chinese Qing dynasty declared war on the world. And several provinces in the south declared autonomy, independence. So do you see this kind of emergence of regionalism, that is obviously very, very nascent, it's probably invisible in your case, could be potentially a force for good? Well, Miles, you ask the easy questions. (2:43:52)

No, that's a very good question. I think it is complicated by the fact that, as you said, since 1949, I think the government has put such an emphasis on kind of a national consciousness of promoting Mandarin. For example, if you live in Shanghai, you could see elderly grandparents speaking Shanghaise to their children who are answering back in crystal clear Mandarin. So over time, what has that done to weaken regionalism? My assumption would be that it's actually weakened it quite a bit. (2:44:20)

However, from the point of view of truth and reconciliation commissions, I think it's still important to potentially have regional or local responses, because there have probably been such amazingly different amounts of repression in different places. Where in Guangdong, potentially there's considerably less, given that it's relatively liberal, and it's had the strong Hong Kong influences over time, compared to other areas where they've had to use much more coercion. (2:44:53)

So that's kind of where I was trying to get at in my remarks regarding why it would be useful to not just have a very high level response, which I think would be important to look at all of the political atrocities over time, but then to actually have some dialogue and truth-telling at the local level. If we look at the Rwanda example, they also divided into three different layers where there was the international criminal tribunal, the national court system, and then very local committees to talk about things on a more reconciliation model. (2:45:31)

So although I don't know to what extent international models could be useful, I think that having that tiered system could potentially be one way forward for China. Okay, great. Nina, I find your remarks are fascinating, because you brought up something that I've never thought about. Inner Mongolia joining outer Mongolia to become an independent state, and the Fujian province joining Taiwan. That's just a really, really interesting and fascinating idea. (2:45:59)

Now, the... I'm not sure it would work, though. I'm not sure they want it. Well, this is all about possibilities. We don't know whether it will work or not. These are possibilities. I just want to throw the idea that's... because a lot of people in China do think about those kind of things. (2:46:19)

You also brought up the Eastern European experience and the Soviet experience, which is relatively sort of bluntness, right? So that's because you have some figures like Yao Chen who they're saying, listen, you want to go, you go. And then they do have some kind of a unique ethnic identity of all these republics, which brings me to thinking about the former president of Taiwan who is the father of Taiwan democracy, Li Teng-hui. Now, Li Teng-hui had this very interesting idea. (2:46:51)

He said China is too big. We've got to divide it into seven parts. Seven parts. Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and then Hangkou, and Taiwan. So all of them together. Rather than disintegration, Nina, the question for you is, would it be possible to have some kind of a federation of states? (2:47:12)

In other words, they have a total autonomy, but then they remain within this framework of one country. It's called the United States of China. I think that that may be a solution for a core group of them that is mainland China right now. But I think that the forcible assimilation policies of the CCP for those ethnic areas has poisoned this whole notion of autonomy. (2:47:43)

Hong Kong is not going to want to have any kind of part of this. I think that they'll want to go on their own. I think that they will all want to leave. And we saw that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics, where the communist leaders wanted to break away at that point. (2:48:12)

They wanted to be the warlords of their areas, or the next democratic president, as the case may be. So I expect them to want to... that they don't quite have this nationalist feeling. They don't share maybe an ideal that America has, our ideals of democracy and rights and freedoms. They don't share that with each other. I don't really know. And it's going to be up to them, and we're not going to be able to stop them racing to the exits, nor are we going to be able to say that you should join this group or that group. (2:48:50)

But what we can do is say, we will shore up your legitimacy, and we will support you in defense or trade or in other ways, if you meet certain conditions that we set out. Now, George H.W.'s administration... Bush's administration's list of guidelines may be good, or the current president may want to add other ones, take away some. So we don't know what those principles are. (2:49:39)

That should be step one the United States should have right now in its best pocket, are those principles. And then we should offer our support for their sovereignty and recognizing their legitimacy and bringing them to the UN if they meet those criteria. Yeah, that's absolutely the core of the issue, right? It's up to them. It's up to them. Not to us, which is basically what Canadians did with Quebec and how the people in Gibraltar, with their own status, you throw a vote. (2:50:12)

And how the people in Spain dealing with the Basque movement, right? So basically, it is a popular sovereignty. You have to go through that process either way. We can try to anticipate what they will do. And I think that it's going to be, I think some of these places like the Republic of Mongolia, which is very small, the most sparsely populated nation on earth, I think, three million people. (2:50:38)

They're going to, I think, they're proud of their freedom. And they may fear Inner Mongolia, which is orders of magnitude larger, no experience of democracy. They may feel that they don't want that. Or they may. So we can anticipate, I would anticipate that they wouldn't want that. But maybe they'd want it. (2:50:59)

Yeah, that's right. Which is really a good segue to what Don has remarked. Can I just add a little more? Please, yeah, go ahead. So I want to endorse the idea that China's nationalities policy over the last 15 years really has poisoned the possibility of what easily could have happened because I was in China in the late 70s as a student and knew some Uyghur students there. (2:51:30)

And they thought they were cooler than the Han students. But they weren't complaining about the jackboot of oppression or something or saying how they're dying to be independent of the rest of China. And that attitude could have persisted till today if it had not been for this terrible change in nationalities policy that we've seen. And Uyghurs might have looked around today and said, would we rather be a part of a democratic, pretty rich China? Or do we want to become another Central Asian stan? And the first option would be much more attractive to a lot of people, certainly. (2:52:19)

So it's by no means a foregone conclusion that every Uyghur is dying for independence from China, except that we've got this terrible policy. Oh, you're right. You don't want to be part of a state that has been genociding you for the last... Yeah, and it's been so heavy handed there with the forced sterilizations, the demographic manipulation, and also this fake relative program that our colleague Nori Turkle writes about. (2:52:42)

It's not just the centralization of policy. For many, many years, I think people were sort of poisoned or indoctrinated, whatever you call it, by the idea that somehow a grand unification is better than independence over there, right? China cannot afford being independent, autonomous, otherwise it's going to be a chaos. So that idea is, I think, is really bad. The idea, the whole issue is about who should decide their own status, right, their own fate. (2:53:12)

So that goes with the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. I mean, to be honest with you, with most of Han Chinese as well. I mean, they do have their own unique economic and even linguistic differences. I think, personally, to me, the difference between my dialogue and the Cantonese is much bigger than the difference between my dialogue and English, for example. (2:53:40)

It's very unique. Now, Don, you mentioned something very interesting. You said we cannot really impose a constitution from outside. You mentioned about the very important issue, outsider and insider issue. I think that's important. It's important. However, just to learn from you, as a contrarian, constructively, the issue, it seems to me, is not external or internal. The issue is whether there is something universal. Now, one of the... we haven't talked about this, about how the regime is going to collapse, right? But the one possibility, even how it might be very distant, but, you know, think about it, it's not. (2:54:21)

One distant possibility of the regime collapsing is because the U.S. and China are getting into war, right? And China has been defeated. And then we have a situation like Japan. When Japan was defeated, what did we do? We gave them a constitution. We wrote the constitution. MacArthur gave it to the Japanese, like it or not. They ratified it, right? So, there is a possibility of that, because that's a universal idea. (2:54:45)

The Japanese embrace it, even to this day. They hold on to their constitution more seriously than we do, right? So, in any case, what I'm saying is, it's a possibility. Yes, there are some lousy foreigners giving bad advice to China throughout history. Frank Goodenough, for example, he wanted, you know, the U.S. had to be the emperor. (2:55:05)

And General Stilwell, you know, for example. It's terrible ideas. But you do have some kind of something universal. Now, I think as Americans, we have something universal to give to the rest of the world. And I think a lot of people in China would love to have some kind of a constitution. It doesn't matter who wrote it, who gave it to them, or what happened. And that they will have an opportunity to ratify, or reject, or accept it. (2:55:26)

So, my question to you is, I'm not trying to repudiate what you say, but what I'm saying is, in the scenario of the collapse, which is very interesting. I watched Justice Neil Gorsuch on C-SPAN the other day. He said something very interesting. He was asking, now, what do you think is the most beautiful part of the American Constitution? Is our Constitution the best in the world? And he said, well, you know, I have read some constitutions from Soviet Union, from China, North Korea. They're beautiful. I mean, they're not fake. It's a freedom of expression. (2:56:02)

Everything is there. We want it. Much better than what we have. But the difference is that they don't have the separation of powers. Power is concentrated. That's what the CCP is all about. (2:56:15)

They monopolize power. So, once you have a monopoly of power, nothing will work. But this is a scenario where we don't have monopoly of power. So, in other words, anything will go as long as the people agree to it. So, I'm asking you, do you agree with what I said? I'm sorry, what's the specific question? The question is, in other words, I don't think it should matter if there is an external or internal Constitution, as long as there is a fair way to have a Constitution, either written by the 50 people, you know, in the Independence Hall, behind the door, or not. (2:57:01)

But the question is, once we have some kind of draft, the people will decide. So, from your remarks, I sense the idea that you reject the idea somehow outsiders should not get involved, or should be totally transparent. So, I guess what I'm trying to say is, so I have, you know, what the Constitution eventually looks like, right? If someone says, oh, you got that idea from foreigners, I think that's a stupid criticism, right? It doesn't matter where the ideas come from. (2:57:33)

The point is, are they good ideas, right? And then the second thing is, are they going to work, you know, in China? So, if you're talking specifically about separation of powers, you know, that seems to be an idea that works generally well, right, in Constitutions. And so, you know, if I'm evaluating the Constitution that comes out of whatever Constitution drafting process occurs, I'm going to say, you know, I think that's probably a good idea. And as you say, the ratification process is also very important. (2:58:08)

So, you know, there's got to be some process, whether it's the drafting process, whether it's the constituent assembly process, or whether it's the ratification process that gives it a kind of, you know, political legitimacy. So, yeah, sure. I mean, if we put it to the body of Chinese voters, you know, and they all approve it 90%, you know, then that's a great source of genuine political legitimacy. Piero, you want to add? Yeah, I think it's important to point out that the notion of universal values also exists in the Chinese tradition. (2:58:46)

The Chinese Communist Party, you know, document number 9, 2012, that, you know, rejects universal values as a Western imposition, is wrong. I mean, you look at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there was a Chinese contribution to that. You see Chang, I mean, so you have essentially Confucian values that are also incorporated and present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. You know, when Li Keqiang, basically his final speech when he retired from public life, he made this statement that men act and heaven watches, you know, renzai gan, tianzai kan. (2:59:27)

And that probably is what got him in trouble with Xi Jinping because he is making an appeal to universal values there by which you can judge the actions of men, in particular one man. And that has resonance, again, with this Confucian tradition that Mencius cites, you know, heaven sees with the eyes of the people and hears with the ears of the people there. (2:59:52)

So this, there is a lot of commonality. And when you look at that, the Constitution of the Republic of China with its five branches, yes, you have separation of power there. And you do have a drawing upon not just the Western tradition, acknowledgement of a Western influence, but also, you know, those two extra branches drawing, again, from an indigenous constitutionalism, one that existed in the imperial system, a check and balance against imperial power that the scholar class represented. (3:00:24)

A friend of mine said very famously that Chinese communism is communism. The irony here is that communism is not only Western, communism is also believed that it's a universal value. (3:00:37)

So anyway, so we have time for a couple questions. Let's go over there first and then, yeah. Thank you. Thanks for a great conference. I'm Dan Tobin with National Intelligence University, but I have to offer the caveat that I'm speaking just on my own behalf, not any part of the U.S. government. I wanted to pull on a thread that William was offering, but open the question to the broader group, and that is that you mentioned national rejuvenation, which is very much, I think, a very deep-seated, you know, both Chinese elite and maybe broader aspiration that the party tries to monopolize, and they very much want people to believe only the party can achieve national rejuvenation. But it seems like if we kind of move the conversation to what could the U.S. do to prepare the ground in the meantime, being able to cast a vision for national rejuvenation that's not the Leninist one that's being offered, and that's not the sort of deleterious one in the international community, but offering one that is rooted in China's tradition, that seems like that would be a useful project. (3:01:57)

And, you know, I'm cognizant that it's not clear that the U.S. government, either in the prior or current administration, is likely to to be doing this, but if you could sort of blank sheet of paper, either kind of, how do you think if you, you know, if you were, you know, if you were in a different context of a U.S. administration who was interested in this, how would you do it? And or, you know, what would some of the pieces of that vision of national rejuvenation, you know, rooted in the Chinese tradition, but not the CCP's vision be? So that's kind of a broad question, but thank you. (3:02:25)

William, go ahead. Thanks, Dan. I mean, that's exactly what I was trying to get at, is that I think that that is a slogan by Xi Jinping, used for coercive means domestically and power projection internationally, but actually has deep resonance with people. And I think we could pull on that. (3:02:51)

I mean, is it, for example, I've talked with Uyghur friends, you know, a friend, Rayan Asat, her brother, Akbar, who's been detained in solitary confinement for years. Is it part of, can you be a great nation if you are putting people in solitary confinement for nothing? I mean, and if we're able to appeal to China and say that if it really wants international respect, it needs to live up to its own human rights commitments that it has signed. (3:03:17)

So I think that that could be a very bare minimum ask that, and a way of reframing it, that I think the Chinese government would have really no way to not, at least engage with. Yeah, I have some thoughts on that too, because, you know, I also referenced that as well. And the response to the Chinese people's, to Xi Jinping's call, is, you know, the laying flat. (3:03:43)

So it's a form of passive resistance. And, you know, you spoke about Confucianism and legalism, but there is another Chinese tradition, you know, Taoism, and, you know, that principle of wu wei. (3:03:53)

When the state is repressive, instead of meeting that force, you just give way. And I think what we're seeing now is that giving way, that laying flat there. But inherent in that idea is the, when that oppressive force, that overwhelming force has expended itself, there is that springing back too. So I think there is these sort of indigenous reserves. (3:04:21)

We've seen this before in Chinese history too, where there is, it is, yeah, it's almost this sort of Taoist wu wei principle so, you know, I think there is hope for a rejuvenation that is organic and indigenous, but it is one that rejects the heavy imposition of the Chinese Communist Party. I think rejuvenation is, you know, first of all, cliches should be avoided, but good cliches need to be avoided. (3:05:05)

One of the good ones is that Samuel Johnson said nationalism is the last refuge of scoundrels. Here again, you know, I, there's nothing more sensitive than the pronunciation that the Chinese Communist Party does not represent the Chinese people. They go crazy, even you mention anything close to that. So that's why I'm saying, when they talk about national rejuvenation, it's not really about the Chinese people. (3:05:26)

I mean, Piero talked about Tang Ping, Lion, Lion Fly. People don't care about this. It's apathetic to this kind of appeal. Because what he was really talking about, the national rejuvenation, is the Chinese Communist Party's rejuvenation, rise to hegemony. So, anyway, yeah. Oh, good, yeah. Okay, let's go with the, I have a question over there. (3:05:54)

Yeah, and then you. Okay, thank you for the opportunity to ask a question again. You seem to be surprised. Yeah, okay, I'm not gonna waste time to do another self-introduction, but what I'm really curious, so obviously when it comes to, like, China turning from autocracy to a democracy, people based in Xinjiang, people based in Tibet or in Hong Kong, they will obviously be accepted for that idea, and they will welcome that idea. (3:06:19)

But in most public opinion polls, especially recently with CCP, actually a lot of people do support the Chinese Communist Party in China. At the high end, it's like 80 to 90 percent, but obviously that's a fake number. There's no government in the world that gets 80 to 90 percent of the support. (3:06:42)

So in the scenario where China, the Chinese government went from a full-on autocracy to a democracy, which hopefully that is the case, how should we expect the broader Chinese people, especially based in the Han ethnicity, accept that transition and that change? Thank you. Let me just take on that, because I know a little bit about that. You say 80 to 90 percent of Chinese people agree with the Communist Party. That's not good enough. (3:07:03)

North Korea is 100 percent. So, yeah, there's actually, one is a survey done by Harvard University. It's a Kennedy School of Guanxi. So there is an Ash Center. The Chinese Communist Party pay a lot of money to that institution. So what they did was they conducted several years of survey inside China, and the conclusion was that something like 93 percent of people all agree they support the Chinese Communist Party. So this lie has been repeatedly cited by the Chinese government, including this spokesperson, year after year after year. (3:07:45)

What happened is that Harvard University never conducted their own survey in China. Nobody can really conduct a genuine survey. Harvard University subcontracted a firm called Horizon Research Group in Beijing, a Chinese firm, to conduct this so-called survey. (3:07:59)

Of course, the result is obvious. In China, you cannot even say Xi Jinping is a jerk. I mean, that's a crime. So, I mean, in this environment where there's no freedom of expression, all surveys were not avoided from the beginning. So that basically answers your question. Winnie the Pooh is a jerk. There you go. (3:08:25)

You can say it here, in every country, but not in China. Can I add something to that? So, yeah, there is not freedom of speech, but I think the real issue with these surveys is that there's not freedom of information. So, in other words, if the question is, is the Chinese Communist Party doing a good job, then relying on these surveys is crazy, right? (3:08:44)

But if the question is, does the average Chinese citizen think that they are groaning under the jackboot of dictatorship, then the answer is they probably don't. However, that is because they're not getting good information. So, in a sense, you could genuinely say that perhaps there is 80 or 90 percent level of support, but it's fragile. (3:09:09)

And if it were exposed to new information about soil pollution, food safety issues, corruption issues, revealing all the assets of top party leaders, then that support would probably drop extremely quickly. I think the issue is information. I would just add that I think that from what I've seen in the past, sometimes there's also the methodological problem where people may say the central government has a high level of support, but the local government wouldn't. And that's because of this by design, where all the problems are placed on the local government, and the central government is always this kind of savior who comes in to rectify the mistakes. (3:09:49)

So, if people were given better information on those surveys, then I think maybe the results would be different. But also, I mean, how could there be more support? I mean, we're just kind of brainstorming, but I think that if there was an economic model, as kind of people like Michael Pettis are always talking about, where there needs to be more of a consumption-based model, there's the hukou reforms potentially, and more support for social services, things that people really care about in terms of their retirement benefits, the five pensions, which are generally, there's a huge looming crisis on those. (3:10:24)

If a democratic government were able to support those things more, you could potentially see how a democracy could maybe gain support through economic legitimacy as well. I think in China, if you don't read the news, you are uninformed. If you do read the news, you are misinformed. So, I knew information, I don't think right now getting information is not the issue. The issue is the consequence of telling the truth. And there's a genuine fear. (3:10:52)

I mean, can you imagine if you go to China and somebody asks you, do you support the Chinese Communist Party's policy? Okay, so even if you think no, I mean, you might think, if I say no, can I trust this guy? (3:11:06)

How am I going to get by if somebody knocks on my door? So, in other words, in the totalitarian regime, in the information-controlled environment, there will be no genuine survey results. Because there is simply a lack of fidelity. So, that's what I'm saying. You can have the accurate survey result only in a country where freedom of expression is 100% guaranteed. So, that's what I'm saying. (3:11:34)

I just want to point out that dropping out is a response. It's a non-response response. And that when you have that across a society, when you have a 996 economy where people just say, what's the point? Where you have not just even, we talk about prison labor and Uyghur forced labor, but even people with college degrees, it's like they're running in place on a treadmill and not making progress. (3:12:13)

So, there is this movement towards just saying, meh. And that's a response, even if it's an A response. 996, by the way, is a Chinese working schedule. From 9 o'clock in the morning to 9 o'clock in the evening, six days a week. I just want to, can a case be made that the Chinese government and party is really not a true communist government, but actually a fascist government in disguise? Because it combines, of course, the authoritarian repression and the nativism and nationalism that's known as fascism with allowing private enterprise, as long as it does the government's bidding compared to a true communist government like Cuba, where the government completely controls the means of production. I was just wondering if you have thought that way, too. (3:13:04)

Thanks. I can answer. I don't agree because it's not in disguise. It's all the things you mentioned, plus the goose stepping of the military. So, other than your statement that it was in disguise... It's not well disguised. It doesn't seem very communist. Xi Jinping invades against welfarism, which makes people lazy. It has a higher Gini coefficient than the United States. There is a core identity. (3:13:46)

There is also a tactical method. I think the regime is basically communism in a way. That doesn't include being fascist. One of the things, if you read communism, you understand the doctrines, you understand the basic tenets of communism. China fits perfectly well. It's a Marxist-Leninist there. You go to China, people keep saying, what's really guiding China right now is the four cardinal principles. (3:14:18)

This is basically true everywhere. I mean, the most important thing is China must have four things. Socialism, which is basically public ownership of all the means of production, use that word. And then Marxism-Leninism, too. And leadership, monopoly power by the Communist Party, and of course, dictatorship of proletariat. That's the fascist side of the regime. That's all the tools of repression. (3:14:54)

So I think it's a fundamentally Marxist-Leninist regime armed with fascist methodologies and approaches. Just one thing. I think we juxtapose fascism and communism as left and right, and that's sort of... I mean, that dates back to the Soviet Union, this juxtaposition. But fascism, in many ways, is an ideology of the left. I mean, certainly true with National Socialism. Mussolini's fascism or the phalange in Spain had ideas of state corporatism, and I think some of that you see in China, too, with these... basically the state-owned enterprises or PLA-owned enterprises. So that would be a more purely fascistic element. (3:15:43)

But fascism and communism, in many ways, are children of the same mother, but they are siblings who fight. But I don't think that communist concept of fascism as being the polar opposite of communism is correct. (3:16:06)

So we're going way beyond time. This is a big topic, and we just hope that this is the beginning of the long conversation. Get ready for the scenario of the communist regime collapse, right? This may be a problem of hope, but also maybe a problem of reality at some point. Totalitarian regimes crack no prior warning, so you never know. So again, look for our publication and the title of this report from the China Center in Houston. It's called China After Communism, Preparing for the Post-CCP China, and it's also available online in digital format. (3:16:53)

And I'd like to thank the panelists again. I mean, doing a fantastic job, and also I'd like to take the opportunity to thank my deputy, Colin Tessier-Kaye, who is the office manager of China Center. He's done a fantastic job. Without him, this would not be possible. So thank you for coming, and again, thank you for your attention to this matter. (3:17:15)

(2025-07-29)